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A UNIFYING THEORY OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Title VII outlaws sex discrimination in employment, directing
that an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment must not be provided in a sexually discriminatory
manner. 1 Title VII encompasses various styles of intentional sex
discrimination, including disparate treatment discrimination and
sexual harassment. While Title VII does not distinguish disparate
treatment and sexual harassment, courts historically have. 2
Disparate treatment generally concerns discrete employment
decisions made because of sex or policies that disadvantage an
employee or group of employees based on their sex. The
employment decisions or judgments at issue in these cases are
usually those that businesses must make in the normal course of
business, such as hiring, firing, and promotion. Conversely, sexual
harassment cases have historically concerned personal sexual
gratification, inequality, and dominance. These cases have involved
treatment of employees, usually women, as sexual objects or sexual
unequals whose function was not merely to be good workers but to
be entertainment or enjoyment for other employees. 3 When such

• The author thanks the University ofMissouri Law School Foundation for its generous
support of this Article. Additional thanks are extended to Professors Christopher Guthrie and
Ann McGinley for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. The author also thanks his
research assistants, William Fritzlen and Elizabeth Meyer. Lastly, the author thanks his
wife Paula, daughter, and family for their constant support.
1
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999) (listing unlawful employment practices). I will
generally refer to "terms, conditions and privileges of employment" simply as "terms of
employment" or "employment terms."
2
See Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court
Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 726 (1999) [hereinafter
White, Nothing Special] ("[F]ederaljudges confronting sexual harassment cases have treated
these claims as something special or different from run of the mill discrimination claims.'').
3
See L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv.
565, 571 (1995) [hereinafter Hebert, Sexual Harassment]. The author opines:
Leering, touching a woman in a sexual way, and making sexually
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treatment resulted in the discriminatory provision of an employee's
terms of employment, Title VII was breached.
Historically, the different visions of disparate treatment and
sexual harassment created separate theories of liability under Title
VII and distinct contexts in which to explore the different causes of
action. The conduct that supported sexual harassment claims and
the conduct that supported disparate treatment claims were
considered sufficiently different to require separate structures of
proof for each claim. Traditionally, disparate treatment claims have
focused on whether the employment decision about which the
plaintiff complained was motivated by the plaintiffs sex or gender. 4
The causation was direct. Conversely, sexual harassment cases
have confronted two distinct questions. The first question is
whether the conduct at issue was of a sexual nature, motivated by
sexual desire, or both. The second question is whether the conduct
caused the discriminatory provision of terms of employment.
Affirmative answers to both inquiries led to the conclusion that the
discriminatory provision of terms was caused by sex and, therefore,
Title VII liability existed. The causation was indirect in that the
harm was deemed caused by gender because the conduct, and thus
the harm, was motivated by sexual desire, was of a sexual nature,
or both.
The United States Supreme Court's recent clarification of the
conduct that can support a sexual harassment claim has altered the
doctrinal basis for differentiating disparate treatment and sexual
harassment claims. 5 Now the conduct underlying a sexual
harassment claim need merely be harassment undertaken because
of the plaintiffs sex or gender rather than harassment based on

explicit comments are all fairly questionable activities in most
settings other than an intimate one. In the workplace, such conduct
not only shows lack of respect for women workers but also suggests
that they are present in the workplace merely to satisfy the sexual
desires of men.

Id.
• See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (determining that sex
stereotyping may have caused or motivated decision to bold plaintift's partnership bid).
5
The Court bas also eliminated the historical doctrinal basis for separating quid pro quo
and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims by noting that the same conduct
may support either type of claim. See infra Part m.
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sexual desire or of a sexual nature. 6 By expanding the range of
conduct that may support a sexual harassment claim in this way,
the Court has indicated that a sexual harassment claim may lie
whenever gender-related harassment, rather than sex-motivated
harassment, affects an employee's terms of employment. This
makes many sexual harassment claims practically indistinguishable
from disparate treatment claims. Arguably, the two types of claims
are no longer doctrinally distinct; sexual harassment is just like
disparate treatment. This simplification of sex discrimination law
is not surprising; it tracks the Court's desire, evident in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 7 to simplify Title VII. 8
The Court has also recast the distinction between the two types
of sexual harassment claims-quid pro quo and hostile work
environment. Now the distinction between these claims is not in the
type of conduct that an employee faces but only in the type of
damage that the employee suffers. 9 If the employee suffers actual
job detriment, a quid pro quo claim may lie; if the employee does not
suffer actual job detriment, a hostile work environment claim may
lie. Thus, the prior presumed doctrinal distinction between hostile
work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment no longer
exists. When this development is combined with the recognition
that any-gender-based harassment may yield sex discrimination, a
unified and simplified theory of sex discrimination emerges: Title
VII is implicated whenever gender-based conduct actually or
constructively harms an employee's terms of employment. This
unified theory is unremarkable in that it merely restates Title VII.
However, it represents a dramatic departure in that it allows Title
VII to expand to its appropriate limit, as defined by its mission, to
promote a truly equal workplace.
While commentators have noted the Court's simplification of
sexual harassment and disparate treatment jurisprudence, they
6
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("[H]arassing
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on
the basis of sex.").
7
509 u.s. 502 (1993).
1
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New
Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996) (tracking Supreme Court's attempt
to simplify definition of discrimination in racial disparate treatment cases).
1
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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have failed to note just how momentous the simplification is. 10 This
Article seeks to rectify this oversight. The Court's simplified theory
of sex discrimination prepares the way for an expansion of sex
discrimination claims. The unified theory must integrate the legal
theories supporting sexual harassment and disparate treatment on
their own terms. 11 Sexual harassment theory recognizes that Title
VII may be violated either when a tangible job detriment has
occurred or when a hostile work environment results from
harassment. Disparate treatment theory recognizes that any
gender-motivated conduct may yield sex discrimination. Thus,
hostile work environment and disparate treatment theory should
combine to produce a new cause of action that makes actionable any
non-harassing, gender-related conduct that creates a hostile work
environment. Not surprisingly, other somewhat less momentous
implications ought to flow from the Court's simplified theory of sex
discrimination as well. Each expands Title VII's potential reach and
will be discussed below. In summation, the Court's simplification
of sex discrimination means that conduct actionable under Title VII
may be significantly broader than previously thought.
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part I consists of a
hypothetical situation which will be referenced throughout the
Article to illustrate sex discrimination jurisprudence. Part II
describes the Supreme Court's disparate treatment jurisprudence.
10
Some commentators view the changes as important, but not extremely so. See, e.g.,
White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 730 (noting that Supreme Court has merged analysis
of sexual harassment law with other claims of intentional discrimination); Steven L. Willborn,
Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fate of Exceptionalism in Sexual
Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 678 (1999) (noting that Oncale "brings
discrimination back into sexual discrimination law").
11
See White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 753 (arguing that ideas underlying
disparate treatment should inform sexual harassment and vice-versa); see also Paul J. Gudel,
Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in
Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 95 (1991) (suggesting that sexual
harassment law's treatment of intent should be imported into disparate treatmentlaw); Mary
Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's Rhetoric and
its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 80 (1998)
C'A more sensible, workable response would be application of concepts underlying Court's
harassment jurisprudence to all disparate treatment cases."); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1714 (1998) (noting hostile work
environment's historical antecedents in disparate treatment discrimination); Miranda Oshige,
Note, What's Sex Got To Do With It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 567 (1995) (proposing that hostile
work environment harassment be treated like disparate treatment).
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Part III describes the Court's restructuring of sexual harassment
jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV examines the elimination of the
distinction between sexual harassment and disparate treatment and
its implications, including the new hostile work environment
disparate treatment claim.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM

Susan Jones began working at PW, Inc. ten years ago. PW is an
accounting firm. During her first several years at PW, Susan's coworkers told her that women at PW were expected to conform to an
antiquated image of femininity. Susan's female co-workers made
clear that were she a superb accountant who conformed to the
partnership's image of a female partner, she would probably become
a partner at PW. However, they also told her of former female
employees who would not adjust to PW's idiosyncratic workplace.
Each of these employees either quit before her partnership vote or
quit after her partnership bid was delayed indefinitely. Those
employees whose partnership bids were delayed experienced
difficulty finding work after leaving PW, as prospective employers
wondered why they would leave PW seemingly on the verge of
becoming partners.
During Susan's tenure at PW, many of her male co-workers and
partners commented to her on her attire ("not stylish enough for a
woman"), her personal style ("too confrontational and masculine"),
and her language ("too coarse for a woman"). AB Susan neared
partnership, she spoke to several partners to ascertain her prospects
of becoming a partner. Each told her that, if she wanted to become
a partner, she needed to act more ladylike, dress more ladylike, and
be more deferential. Most of the partners Susan spoke to noted that
while they would support her candidacy, other partners likely would
not unless she projected a more feminine and deferential demeanor.
Not surprisingly, Susan was upset that her partnership appeared
contingent on altering her personality and behavior. Susan,
however, did not change her dress, manner, or appearance. Rather,
after becoming a very capable accountant, Susan quit PW to join
another firm before her partnership vote. She simply did not believe
that she would become a partner at PW. Unfortunately, Susan's pay
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at her new firm was lower than it had been at PW, and she would
not be eligible for partnership until three years after she would have
been eligible at PW.
III. DISPARATE TREATMENT SEX DISCRIMINATION

Title VII is a hybrid civil rights/labor statute that outlaws sex
discrimination that results in the discriminatory provision of
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. It
reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to-fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . . .
sex .... 12

Title VII covers all aspects of the employment relationship. 13 It
applies to pre-employment conduct, conduct occurring during

12

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999).
See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (intimating broad reading of
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U .8. 69, 75
(1984) (noting that terms, conditions and privileges of employment are not limited to
incidents of employment found in employment contract, but rather that they may arise from
treatment generally afforded to employees in course of employment); Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that" 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
. . . is an expansive concept"); Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D. Md. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1158 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that while "[n}ot every aspect of an employment
relationship constitutes a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment, .•. the phrase 'terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment' includes any benefit that was part and parcel of the
employment''); Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count As Terms, Conditions or
Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 654 (1996) (noting broad
language in Title VII regarding what employer practices it covers). But see Reno v.
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 977 F. Supp. 812, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (suggesting that
employer's refusal to allow employee to attend training session did not amount to change in
terms or conditions of employment); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47
EMORY L.J. 1121, 1153 (1998) [hereinafter White, De Minimis Discrimination] (noting that
"terms, conditions and privileges" has been read by some courts to include only "materially
adverse employer action").
13
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employment, and post-employment retaliatory conduct. 14
Disparate treatment discrimination is the easiest form of sex
discrimination to recognize. 15 Its essence is that an employee is
intentionally treated differently with respect to terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment than his or her opposite-gendered coworker because of the employee's sex. 16 In Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 17 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc./ 8 and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 19 the Supreme Court described disparate
treatment claims, making clear that policies and actions resulting
in differential treatment of men and women with respect to
employment can lead to Title VII liability.
In Phillips, plaintiff Ida Phillips challenged Martin Marietta's
policy of declining to accept "job applications from women with preschool-age children" at the same time it "employed men with pre-

14
See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (holding that former employees are
covered by§ 704(a), Title VII's retaliation provision); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d
139, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) C'Post-employment actions by an employer can constitute
dilcrimination under Title VII if they hurt a plaintiffs employment prospects."); Veprinsky
v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e believe that post-termination acts
of retaliation that have a nexus to employment are actionable under Title VII ...."); Landon
v. Northwest Airlines, 72 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that post-termination
retaliatory acts may be actionable when certain conditions are met); Von Zuckerstein v.
Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that refusal to rehire might
amount to actionable retaliation).
15
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977}
(noting that disparate treatment "is the most easily understood type of discrimination").
Many forms ofsex discrimination exist, including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
sexual harassment. Disparate impact discrimination is nonintentional discrimination that
occurs when an employment policy unevenly burdens different races, genders, or groups of
employees based on protected classifications. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
434 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact as viable theory under Title VII).
16
To assert a o:ause of action, Title VII merely requires that the employee's sex be a
motivating factor for the conduct at issue. See 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(m) (1999) ("[A]n unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex
..• was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice."); see also Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th
Cir. 1999) ("So long as the plaintiff demonstrates ... that he would not have been treated in
the same way had he been a woman, he has proven sex discrimination. The most direct route
•.. is via proof that men and women were treated differently in the workplace."); Willborn,
supra note 10, at 693 ("If sex is a motivating factor, then the discrimination element [of a
Title VII case] is met.j.
17
400 u.s. 542 (1971).
18
499 u.s. 187 (1991).
II 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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school-age children."20 Although the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida21 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit22 both ruled that Martin Marietta was
entitled to summary judgment, the Supreme Court decided that
Martin Marietta's policy amounted to sex discrimination. The
Court's finding was based on the fact that Martin Marietta treated
men with pre-school-age children differently than women with preschool-age children. 23 While noting that Martin Marietta might
have sufficient justification for the discriminatory policy to avoid
Title VII liability-a suggestion that Justice Thurgood Marshall
forcefully challenged24-the Court recognized that the differential
treatment of female workers because they are female is sex
discrimination that may lead to Title VII liability. 25
In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 26 at issue was the employer's
different treatment of fertile women and fertile men. Johnson
Controls's determination that exposure to elevated levels oflead on
its factory floor could heighten the incidence of birth defects in
children born to women who worked on the factory floor led to a
policy restricting fertile women, but not fertile men, from working
in certain well-paying factory floor jobs. The policy distinguished
employees based on their sex even though evidence suggested that
elevated lead levels harmed male reproduction as well. 27 Although
20

Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 1968 WL 140 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 1968).
22
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
23
Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. Martin Marietta's policy can be viewed more accurately as
one that is different for women with pre·school·age children than for everyone else in the
workplace, including men with pre·school·age children. Nonetheless, it is easiest to isolate
the policy's discriminatory impact ifwomen with pre·school·age children are compared to men
with pre·school·age children.
24
See id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that Congress sought to eliminate
limitations on women's employment opportunities based on stereotypes and "ancient canards
about the proper role of women").
25
Id. at 544.
26
499 u.s. 187 (1991).
~ Although the Court did not clarify whether the evidence indicated that the harm to
male reproduction was of the same type as the harm to female reproduction, the Court
appeared influenced by Johnson Controls's lack of concern regarding male reproductive
ability. The Court noted: "Despite evidence in the record about the debilitating effect oflead
exposure on the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the
harms that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees." Id. at 198.
Arguably, Johnson Controls focused on the harm to the fetus, rather than on the
21
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Johnson Controls's rule was ostensibly designed to protect putative
fetuses from exposure to dangerous levels of lead in a mother's
bloodstream, it also disqualified fertile women from higher-paying
jobs that fertile men could hold. The policy also protected men who
worked or wanted to work in factory floor jobs from competition
from fertile women. The discriminatory bias of Johnson Controls's
rule was clear. The employees excluded from factory floor jobs were
exclusively women, and they were therefore ineligible for those
relatively lucrative jobs.28 The Court invalidated Johnson Controls's
policy because it amounted to sex discrimination that was not
statutorily excused.29
While Martin Marietta and Johnson Controls concerned groups
of women who were victims of explicit discriminatory rules or
policies, Title VII's prohibition on disparate treatment
discrimination also applies to situations in which particular
employees are held to different standards of conduct because of their
gender. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 30 the Supreme Court
recounted Ann Hopkins's attempt to become a partner at Price
Waterhouse, one of the country's most prestigious accounting
firms. 31 Hopkins successfully completed her work tasks and was,
according to the district court, a highly productive manager with the
most successful record of bringing substantial business to Price
Waterhouse of all managers who were forwarded for partnership the
same year as Hopkins. Price Waterhouse, however, proffered
Hopkins's interpersonal skills as its justification for declining to
make her a partner. 32
policy's burden on female employees. Nonetheless, because only women can become
pregnant, only women suffered a direct negative effect from the policy. Of course, Congress
has deemed pregnancy discrimination sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1999)
("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions •..."); Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. at 198·99 (noting that Pregnancy Discrimination Act includes pregnancy
discrimination as sex discrimination).
28
AJJ the Court noted: "The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but
not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health
for a particular job." Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197.
29
Id. at206.
30
490 u.s. 228 (1989).
31
Ann Hopkins tells her story in ANN BRANIGAR HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING
PARTNER THE HARD WAY (1996).
32
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35 (discussing partners' appraisal of Ann
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In accordance with the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court
determined that sex-based biases, along with concerns about
Hopkins's interpersonal skills, may have affected the partnership
decision. While some partners did mention Hopkins's job-related
interpersonal skills in their evaluations, others criticized Hopkins's
use of profanity and some ofher ostensibly "masculine" personality
traits to forestall her elevation to partner. 33 Apparently, some
partners wanted Hopkins to act more "femininely'' (as defined by the
predominantly male partnership) before she was made a partner. 34
That this was the partnership's desire was not lost on the partner
tasked with telling Hopkins why her partnership was placed on
hold. He told Hopkins that "in order to improve her chances for
partnership ... Hopkins should 'walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.' "35 The Court determined that a
requirement that a woman act in a certain manner in order to
procure a partnership she would have obtained based on
performance alone were she a man constituted disparate treatment
discrimination under Title VII. 36 On remand, Hopkins was made a
partner. 37
Hopkins's interpersonal skills).
33
See id. at 235-37 (noting partners' comments concerning Ann Hopkins's supposedly
masculine characteristics). Specifically, the Court noted:
The [district court] judge went on to decide, however, that some of
the partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an
impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and
that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such
comments. He held that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully
discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously
giving credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted from
sex stereotyping.
Id. at 236-37.
a. Id. at 235. At least one commentator has suggested that regardless of the standard
of femininity that women are held to, it is an inappropriately male standard. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 71-72 (1987)
{hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] (suggesting that sex discrimination law
requires that women conform to male standard for men or to male standard for women, and
that it is unclear that either standard is appropriate).
36
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
88
Id. at 258. Price Waterhouse disputed that Hopkins would have been made partner
were she a man, claiming that her non-gender-based interpersonal skills alone were sufficient
to place her candidacy on hold. Id. at 236, 252.
37
Price Waterhouse's claim that its decision would have been the same had Hopkins been
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These three cases are merely examples of the Supreme Court's
disparate treatment sex discrimination jurisprudence.
An
employment decision motivated by an employee's sex or gender that
harms the employee's terms of employment constitutes actionable
sex discrimination. 38 At core, Title VII outlaws treating similarly
situated employees differently because of their gender. By
definition, disparate treatment is differential treatment. Thus,
while arguments regarding whether any two employees or any two
groups of employees are similarly situated will always exist, once it
is determined that a woman and a man-or a group of women and
a group of men-are similarly situated, they must be treated
similarly. 39 Hence, fertile female and male employees had to be
treated similarly in Johnson Controls; 40 women and men with
school-age children had to be treated similarly in Phillips; and
worthy female and male partner candidates had to be treated
similarly in Price Waterhouse.
In each case mentioned above, had the women involved been
treated the same as their male co-workers, they would have enjoyed
the possibility of better and more lucrative employment. That their
employment options were restricted by discrimination triggered
Title VII applicability. Absent discrimination, Ida Phillips would
have had the opportunity to compete for a job at Martin Marietta;
fertile female employees at Johnson Controls would have been able

a man was eventually rejected. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C.),
a[fd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
31
Of course, whether the discrimination is statutorily excused under Title VII is a
different question. Justification for discriminatory treatment depends on the narrow bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense. In Johnson Controls, the key issue was
whether sex was a BFOQ for the jobs at issue. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
200·01 (1991). BFOQ defenses only arise, however, once discriminatory treatment is
demonstrated or cc•nceded.
39
See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) C'An
employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against 'because of his or her sex if, 'but-for'
the employee's sex, he or she would not have been the victim of the discrimination.");
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 195-96 (1979)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN] (suggesting that determining whether treatment
would have occurred if plaintiff were male is key inquiry in determining if sex discrimination
occurred).
~ 0 Interestingly, one of the plaintiffs in Johnson Controls was a man who wanted to start
a family but could not transfer from his factory floor job without suffering job detriment.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192.
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to compete for the higher-paying factory floor jobs; and Ann Hopkins
would have been made a Price Waterhouse partner. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, if Title VII prohibits anything, it
prohibits providing different job opportunities and compensation to
employees and potential employees because of sex.
That each of the women in these cases suffered an overt and
obvious job detriment or denial of a job opportunity made their cases
easy to recognize as disparate treatment cases. In other cases,
however, courts disagree about how serious the job detriment must
be to be cognizable. While the Supreme Court noted in Hishon v.
King & Spaldingu that Title VII covers any benefit that the
employer provides to its employees, 42 whether Title VII covers
literally every benefit that could be considered a term, condition, or
privilege of employment remains unclear. Professor Rebecca
Hanner White analyzed the problems surrounding this issue in her
article, De Minimis Discrimination. 43 Professor White noted that
some courts limit disparate treatment claims to those situations in
which an actual employment decision or materially adverse
employer action has occurred. 44 Other courts do not require that
differential treatment yield a discriminatory employment action but
do set a threshold of harm below which disparate treatment claims
will not be cognizable. 45

41
42

467

u.s. 69 (1984).

Id. at 74-75.
43
Supra note 13; see also Beiner, supra note 13, at 656·63 (discussing what counts as a
term, condition or privilege of employment); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1714·16.
44
See White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13, at 1136-42 (discussing circuit
split concerning requirement of"ultimate employment decision").
45
See id. at 1135 ("While the courts disagree on how high a threshold of harm is needed,
most agree that such a threshold does exist."). For example, in Crady v. Liberty National
Bank, 993 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff was transferred from a "branch manager
position to a collections officerpositionLJ" id. at 135-36, but with the same salary. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the transfer was insufficient
to constitute an actionable job detriment, noting that "a materially adverse change in the
terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or
an alteration of job responsibilities." I d. at 136. While Crady was brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) rather than Title VII, its analysis is nonetheless
applicable to the Title VII context. Title VII and the ADEA share many core concepts. See
id. at 134-35 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a Title VII case,
regarding ADEA prima facie case and accompanying shifting burdens).
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While what constitutes a term or benefit of employment may be
construed broadly by many courts, this broad construction occurs in
the context of tangible job benefits. How terms of employment will
be construed outside of that context is unclear because disparate
treatment claims are rarely interpreted outside of the context of
actual job detriment. 46 While Title VII is not limited to remedying
economic harm47 it is not clear how fully non-economic harms will
be remedied in the context of disparate treatment discrimination.
This uncertainty would likely eliminate any possibility of recovery
for our hypothetical plaintiff, Susan Jones.
The expectations Susan Jones faced at PW are very similar to
those Ann Hopkins faced at Price Waterhouse. Both were expected
to be a certain type of woman, rather than merely a good worker.
After her partnership was delayed, Hopkins was told by a partner
that she should be more feminine. Similarly, Jones was told by
partners and associates that she should be more ladylike so that she
might become a partner. 48 The Price Waterhouse Court indicated
that requiring employees to conform to sex stereotypes may
constitute sex discrimination. 49 Under the reigning view of
disparate treatment discrimination, however, the course of conduct
Susan Jones has endured has yet to affect her employment terms,
making the success of her claim highly unlikely. Consequently,
Susan Jones will need a change in conventional legal wisdom in
order to succeed. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has, possibly
unwittingly, paved the way for Susan to make her claim.
46

Many of the Supreme Court's seminal disparate treatment cases have involved
tangible job benefits. E.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't
of Community AffaJ.rs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
792.
47
That Title VII covers non-economic harm is clear. See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination.").
However, Vinson was a sexual harassment case in which the offensive nature of the alleged
harassment caused the non-economic psychological harm. Id. at 60-61. That a number of
courts have required an actual adverse employment decision after Vinson was decided
suggests that many courts view disparate treatment and sexual harassment claims
differently.
~ Arguably, the hypothetical course of conduct includes any prior conduct by PW
partners that has suggested that women should act femininely in order to succeed. See
generally White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13.
49
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256-58 (1989) (discussing role ofsexual
stereotyping in employment decisions).
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IV. SEXUAL HARAsSMENT

Sexual harassment and disparate treatment have historically
been distinguished by the style of conduct underlying each cause of
action. Disparate treatment liability has usually resulted from a
discriminatory employment decision. Sexual harassment liability,
on the other hand, has typically resulted from unwelcome gendermotivated harassment50 that results in the discriminatory provision
of terms of employment. 51 To be clear, being harassed in the
workplace, even because of one's sex, is not in itself actionable; 52
only when such unwelcome harassment changes an employee's
terms of employment does the harassment become actionable. 53
Recent scholarship suggests that sexual harassment's link to sex
discrimination has not been adequately explained. 54 Nonetheless,

50
Sexual harassment must be unwelcome to be actionable. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68
C'The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome."). While unwelcomeness may be important when an employee does not mind
being treated differently than someone of the opposite gender, if the harassment actually
changes the terms of employment, it is possible that we should not care whether the
harassment was welcome or unwelcome. See Hebert, supra note 3, at 577 (noting that often
unwelcomeness of harassment need not be proven when context of denigrating and hostile
conduct suggests unwelcomeness). Nonetheless, as sexual banter and sexual activity between
co-workers can be consensual and desired, unwelcomeness can be in dispute in many
harassment cases.
&I See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (finding harassment actionable when it sufficiently alters
conditions of employment).
52 See Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that use of
vulgar, sex-related taunts does not constitute sexual harassment when it is clear that taunts
are part of personal vendetta unrelated to victim's gender); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104
F.3d 822, 827 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that even when harassment occurs, it may not cause
workplace to become objectively hostile, as required for liability).
53
Title VII, whether in the disparate treatment context or the sexual harassment
context, does not cover harassment that falls below that level. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67
(noting that "not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term,
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII"); Galloway v. General
Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between
rude comments directed at women and comments directed at a woman because she is a
woman); Holtz v. Marcus Theatres Corp., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1147 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (''Merely
yelling at female employees and calling them names does not rise to the level of actionable
hostile work environment."); White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 746 (noting that
discrimination at large is not prohibited and that discrimination becomes prohibited only
when it affects terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
M Several recent articles have focused on what constitutes sexual harassment and why
sexual harassment is sex discrimination. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual
Harassment With Respect, 111 HARv. L. REv. 445 (1997) (detailing shortcomings of current
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sexual harassment is sex discrimination. 55 When gender-motivated
harassment alters an employee's terms of employment, 56 such
alteration is deemed to have occurred "because of sex," thereby
violating Title VII. 57
Whether an employer will be liable for such harassment under
Title VII depends upon whether the employer is deemed responsible
for the discrimination. Employer responsibility depends, in turn, on
what the employer knew, when the employer knew it, and what
steps the emp:oyer took to prevent or remedy the harassment that
caused the discrimination. 58 The employer, rather than the
employee engaging in harassing conduct, is liable under Title VII59

law); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
692 (1997) C'While our intuitions may lead us to conclude that when a man directs offensive
sexual conduct at a female colleague, sex discrimination is afoot, the Supreme Court has not
offered a theory as to why this is the case."); Schultz, supra note 11.
es See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (noting that sexual
harassment is subsumed under Title VII); see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D. Me. 1998) (noting that differential treatment of sexes is key to
sexual harassment claims).
116
Nearly any benefit stemming from a job can be considered a term, condition or
privilege of employment. See Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D. Md. 1996)
(noting that many incidents of employment amount to terms, conditions or privileges of
employment when they are traditionally afforded to employees in plaintiffs position). Indeed,
seemingly insignificant differences can amount to discrimination under Title VII. See Carroll
v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032·33 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring women
to wear uniforms while allowing men to wear own suits violates Title VII). But see supra
notes 43-45.
57
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1999) C'[A}n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice."); Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64 C'Without question, when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."); see also Willborn, supra note 10, at 687 (suggesting
mixed motives type analysis for determining whether discrimination underlies conduct that
may support sexual harassment claim).
58
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09 (1998) (finding failure to
disseminate sexual harassment policy and to keep track of supervisor's conduct to be
ineffective communication of policy); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (discussing failure to
promulgated sexual harassment policy as evidence of failure to fulfill obligation of reasonable
care); Franke, supra note 54, at 701 n.29 (suggesting that employer liability standard for
sexual harassment is "known or should have known").
59
Generally, individual employees who engage in sexual harassment will not be liable
under Title VII. SEe Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) C'[A} supervisor
does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of an employer ....");
Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) C'Under Title VII there is no personal
liability for employ•3es, including supervisors ...."); Miller v. Maxwell, Int'l, 991 F.2d 583,
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because the employer is responsible for creating and maintaining
the workplace as well as providing and tailoring the employment
relationship, and must generally be responsible for discrimination
in its provision. 60 As a result, employer tolerance of or indifference
to sexual harassment can be the precursor to Title VII liability. 61
A. SEXUALLY HARASSING CONDUCT

Sexual harassment may include sexual advances, sexually
themed comments and conduct, and non-sexually themed comments
and conduct. 62
While the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex appear to
suggest that sexual harassment may be limited to "[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature," 63 the Supreme Court has made

587-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no personal liability resulting from employment
discrimination); see also Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability For
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509 (1996) (suggesting that personal liability for
discrimination against employees is defensible but unwise). However, these employees may
be liable under other laws. See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 158 (noting
that under certain conditions sexual harassment can be criminal or tortious).
110
When the terms of employment change, the employer must be held responsible. It is
somewhat disingenuous to suggest that the employer is not responsible when an employee's
conditions of employment are altered through harassment, given that the employer generally
controls the conditions of employment. Without clear evidence to the contrary, a supervisor
who is responsible for maintaining the workplace's atmosphere should know that the
harassment is occurring. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57, 76 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("[A] supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the
work environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace."). Arguably, when the
supervisor knows or should have known that harassment is occurring, the employer knows
or should have known as well However, this assumption might be problematic when the
supervisor is the harassing employee. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810 ("The Court of Appeals
also rejected the possibility that it could hold the City liable for the reason that it knew of the
harassment vicariously through the knowledge of its supervisors. We have no occasion to
consider whether this was error, however.").
61
See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 518 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that employer can be
liable for sexual harassment ifit knew or should have known ofharassment and failed to take
corrective action); Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that
hostile work environment prima facie case requires that plaintiff argue that employer knew
or should have known about harassment but did not take remedial action).
62
Commentators have suggested that much gender harassment is unrelated to sexuality.
See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 11, at 1687 ("[M]uch of the time, harassment assumes a form
that has little or nothing to do with sexuality but everything to do with gender.").
63
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999).
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clear that sexual harassment includes harassment motivated by an
employee's gender, whether it is of a sexual nature or not. 64 In
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 65 the Court ruled that
any harassment that could create an inference of discrimination
because of sex could be actionable. 66 Though plaintiff Joseph Oncale
was subject to sexualized harassment that could be considered of a
sexual nature, including threats of rape, 67 the Court indicated that
if the harassment were actionable, it would be so because it
constituted discrimination because of sex.68 Indeed, the Court noted
that even non-sexualized harassment "motivated by general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace" could constitute
sexual harassment. 69 Consequently, any harassment undertaken or
motivated by the victim's gender can be considered sexual
harassment. 70

sc Despite the language in its guidelines, the EEOC seems to recognize that sexual
harassment need not be of a sexual nature. See Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at
1565 nn.3-4 (noting that in 1993 the EEOC proposed guidelines that were subsequently
withdrawn at behest of Congress indicating that "nonsexual conduct motivated by gender
[could] also constitute discrimination on the basis of sex''); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1732
C'Even though the EEOC Guidelines focus on sexual conduct, the EEOC has long recognized
that nonsexual, gender-based harassment may violate Title Vll.").
615
523 u.s. 75 1_1998).
66
See id. at 80-81 (arguing that harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire to
be classified as discrimination based on sex); White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 733
("The question is not whether the harassment is sexual but whether it is being directed
against this particular individual because of his sex.''). The Oncale Court further noted that
"harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
67
See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77 (providing general description of conduct); see also Doe v.
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (noting
plaintift's same-sex harassment, including grabbing of genitals and numerous sexual threats).
81
Harassment can serve many gender-related ends without being focused on sexual
activity. See Franke, supra note 54, at 696 ("Sexual harassment can also be understood to
enforce gender norms when it is used to keep gender nonconformists in line.''); Schultz, supra
note 11, at 1755 (noting that harassment can be used to attempt to keep certain jobs male
bastions).
118
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
70
One court suggested this years ago. See McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (noting that sexual harassment need not be sexualized to be actionable); see also
Franke, supra note 54, at 696 (suggesting "reconceptualization of sexual harassment as
gender harassment"); Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1567-68 ('Gender
harassment-hostile and denigrating nonsexual activity directed at women because they are
women (or at men because they are men)-differs from sexual harassment-sexual activity
directed at women because they are women (or at men because they are men) often motivated
by hostility and intended to be denigrating-only in the choice of weapon used.''); Schultz,
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The Oncale decision was momentous because it clarified what
conduct is sufficient to support a sexual harassment claim and thus
simplified the sexual harassment cause of action. Before Oncale,
the requirement that actionable conduct be related to sexual desire
or be of a sexual nature led to interesting ramifications for same-sex
harassment. The restriction led some courts to limit same-sex
harassment causes of action to those involving same-sex harassment
by homosexuals who were presumably driven by sexual desire. 71
This left an employee who was sexually harassed by another person
of the same gender without a claim unless the harassment was of a
specific type. The Oncale Court shifted the focus of the harassment
inquiry to whether an employee was harassed because of his sex,
where Title VII suggests it should be.
Harassment motivated by sexual desire, harassment undertaken
because of gender, and sexualized harassment can all be considered
discrimination because of sex. 72 However, an evidentiary distinction
remains between harassment grounded in sexual desire and
harassment not motivated by desire. Conduct motivated by sexual
desire can generally be assumed to be motivated by the victim's
gender, 73 while conduct, not motivated by sexual desire must be
supra note 11, at 1700 (discussing Carroll Brodsky's view that sexual harassment's scope is
much broader than sexual advances; sexual harassment is not always "rooted in sexual desire
or a need for sexual domination").
11
Courts have limited same-sex harassment claims in various ways. See Oncale, 523
U.S. at 79 (discussing various ways courts have limited same-sex harassment claims, and
noting that they were incorrect).
11
See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 1998 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that there
are myriad ways to engage in harassment, including through opposite-sex sexual advances,
same-sex sexual advances, and non-sexual general hostility); Penry v. Federal Home Loan
Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("Conduct that is overtly sexual may be presumed
to be because of the victim's gender; however, actionable conduct is not limited to behavior
motivated by sexual desire."); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality
in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO.
L.J. 399, 410 (1996) (noting distinction between gender-specific harassment and gender-based
sexual harassment); Willbom, supra note 10, at 685-86 (differentiating conduct of sexual
nature and conduct not of sexual nature).
73
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The Court in Oncale noted:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the
challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals
of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would
not have been made to someone of the same sex.
Id.; see also Schultz, supra note 11, at 1741 (noting that courts have suggested that "sexually
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proven to be motivated by the victim's sex to be actionable. 74
Nonetheless, an employee may be harassed through a single
continuous course of sexual harassment that includes any
combination of conduct, whether related to sexual desire or not. 75
B. TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Sexual harassment consists of two branches: quid pro quo and
hostile work environment harassment. 76 Quid pro quo sexual
harassment requires that an actual job detriment be conditioned on
and occur as a result of sexual harassment. The prototypical
example of qui'.d pro quo harassment posits a supervisor who fires
an employee for refusing to provide sexual favors. 77 Hostile work
explicit advances are presumed to be sex-based while other problems must be proven so").

But see White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 733 ("The [Oncale] Court also rejected the
contention that when harassment is sexual it is necessarily gender-based.'').
74
Interestingly, the differing nature of conduct of a sexual nature and conduct not of a
sexual nature has led some courts to analyze the two types of conduct separately in
determining if a Title VII claim exists. E.g., King v. Board of Regents ofUniv. of Wis., 898
F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990) (disaggregating sexualized harassment and non-sexualized
harassment); see Schultz, supra note 11, at 1711-12, 1716-20 (discussing courts that treat
harassment of sexual nature differently than harassment not of sexual nature); see also
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D. Me. 1998)
(distinguishing sex and gender discrimination).
75
If a group of employees engages in sex-based and non-sex-based harassment to harass
one of their co-workers because of that co-worker's sex, their conduct may not escape scrutiny
merely because neither the sex-based harassment alone nor the non-sex-based harassment
alone would be sufficient to support a cognizable claim. See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell
Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1994} (noting that conduct supporting hostile
work environment claim need not be solely sexual in nature); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (detailing harassment related to sexual
activity and harassment unrelated to sexual activity). Some commentators have suggested
that courts should be clearer in finding that harassment not of a sexual nature can be
aggregated with conduct of a sexual nature in determining that sexual harassment occurred.
See Franke, supra note 54, at 1709 (suggesting that courts treat harassment ofsexual nature
and sexual harassment not of sexual nature as part of single course of conduct).
78
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998) (noting that quid pro quo
and hostile work environment discrimination have been considered, although arguably
incorrectly, different categories of sexual harassment); Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (distinguishing quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment);
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1987) ("Although sexual
harassment may take a variety of forms, courts have consistently recognized two distinct
categories of sexual harassment claims: quid pro quo sexual harassment, and hostile work
environment sexual harassment.").
71
See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 ("Women lost some of the first Title VII cases
challenging harassment. These cases involved the by-now-familiar fact pattern: Female
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environment harassment, on the other hand, merely requires that
an employee's terms of employment be constructively altered by the
harassment. The typical hostile work environment is a workplace
tinged with sexual advances, explicit sex talk, sexual innuendo,
gender-based hostility, or some combination of such conduct that is
severe enough to affect an employee's ability to do her job.78 Quid
pro quo and hostile work environment harassment have been
thought to be different because the conduct typically supporting
each claim is somewhat distinct. 79 The Supreme Court, however,
recently made clear that the distinction between quid pro quo and
hostile work environment sexual harassment is the concreteness of
the harm the harassment causes rather than the style of conduct
underlying each cause of action. 80

plaintiffs complained that they had been fired or mistreated for refusing their male superiors'
sexual advances.").
78
See Aldridge v. Kansas, No. 96-2382-JWL, 1997 WL 614323, at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 10,
1997) C'Rather than subjecting plaintiff to a few sexual comments, however, the plain tift's
evidence, ifbelieved, is that Mr. Pritchard made weekly suggestive comments about plaintift's
breasts and buttocks for a period of over four years. When viewed together with his other,
more sporadic unwelcome sexual innuendos, allegations, and advances, a reasonable and
prudent person could conclude that Mr. Pritchard's actions were sufficiently pervasive to
create a hostile work environment."); Stoeckel v. Environmental Management Sys., Inc., 882
F. Supp. 1106, 1115 n.l3 (D.D.C. 1995) C'The Court notes that cases in which other courts
have found conduct to constitute hostile work environment discrimination typically involve
explicit sexual advances toward the recipient, sexual innuendo, sexual comments or
derogatory comments to the recipient in the presence of other employees, comments or
actions of a lewd or tasteless nature, and similarly severe behavior."); cf. Schultz, supra note
11, at 1710 C'To a large extent, the courts have restricted the conception of hostile work
environment harassment to male-female sexual advances and other explicitly sexualized
actions perceived to be driven by sexual designs.'').
79
Not only are the two types of harassment different, quid pro quo harassment is
arguably worse. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The most oppressive
and invidious type of workplace sexual harassment is quid pro quo sex.").
80
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742 (noting precedent that required harassment to be severe
or pervasive if making hostile environment claim); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998) (noting that whether environment is hostile or abusive depends on looking at all
circumstances including frequency and severity of conduct). While the Supreme Court never
explicitly distinguished quid pro quo and hostile work environment discrimination on the
basis of the style of conduct underlying each claim, it has recognized that others have. See
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751 C'The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful,
perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and
those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility.");
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (noting and implicitly accepting EEOC's distinction between hostile
work environment and quid pro quo harassment).
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1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment
explicitly alters the terms of an employee's employment. 81 Thus, a
supervisor who conditions the avoidance of job detriment on an
employee's provision of sexual favors, then takes adverse action
when the employee declines to grant those favors has engaged in
quid pro quo harassment. 82 The harassment is undertaken for
personal gratification with the leverage being the power and
willingness to change concrete terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. Since the harassment stems from the employee's
sex, 83 the discl'iminatory provision of the terms of employment has
occurred because of sex, and Title VII is therefore violated. 84 The

81

See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752 (indicating that quid pro quo harassment concerns explicit
alterations in terms or conditions of employment and that hostile work environment
harassment concerns constructive alterations in terms or conditions of employment).
112
In some situations, linking job benefits with sex is not actionable. See EEOC: Policy
Guide on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism Under Title VII, 8 Lab. ReL Rep. (BNA)
No. 694, at 6817 (Jan. 12, 1990) (noting that preferential treatment based on consensual
romantic relationship may be unfair to women and men and is therefore generally not in
violation of Title VII because both are disadvantaged for reasons other than gender); see also
Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences, 167 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that sexual favoritism in form of giving job benefits to person with whom one is
having affair is likely not sufficient to support another worker's hostile work environment
claim); Elger v. Martin Mem'l Health Sys., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1353·54 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(noting that claim that plaintiff was terminated so that his boss's girlfriend could be promoted
to plaintiff's job was not hostile work environment claim, rather it was akin to nepotism not
actionable under Title VII); Ayers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 826 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (determining that favoritism in hiring or promoting former lovers is more akin to
nepotism than sexism and is not prohibited by Title VII). Of course, this is problematic. Title
VII is supposed to remove the link between sex and employment from the workplace.
Allowing job benefits to be linked to sex allows this link to remain. Consequently, if Title VII
were read relatively expansively, any person who was denied a job benefit because the benefit
went to someone who was a sexual favorite of the supervisor could sue. But see Michael J.
Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause ofAction for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. &LEE L. REv.
547, 549-50 (1994) (disagreeing with many courts and commentators who have suggested that
Title VII liability could lie for harm to those disadvantaged by sexual favoritism).
83
We assume the supervisor would not have added the term to the employment
relationship of a person of the opposite gender. Although, under this theory, a bisexual
supervisor escapes exposing the employer to Title VII liability, this is of little moment. See
Willborn, supra note 10, at 683 n.22 (noting rarity of bisexual harasser). Regardless of how
offensive a supervisor's behavior may be, ifthe supervisor's action is not taken because of sex
or on the basis of sex, Title VII does not appear to prohibit the behavior. However, other
statutes may. See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 158 (suggesting that
many acts of sexual harassment could be treated as independently criminal or tortious).
84
See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that harassment would
not have occurred had plaintiff been male); Franke, supra note 54, at 702-05 (noting that one
justification for treating sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII was that
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actual job detriment is proof that the terms of the employment
relationship were concretely altered. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recently ruled that actual job detriment must visit a plaintiff
before an actionable quid pro quo harassment claim arises, meaning
that actual job detriment is the only proof sufficient to demonstrate
the concrete alteration of employment terms.
In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 85 plaintiff Kimberly Ellerth
charged that Ted Slowik, her supervisor's superior, harassed her by
making numerous inappropriate sexual comments regarding her
dress and appearance. The offending comments included possible
threats to harm Ellerth's employment if she did not provide sexual
liberties or act in a more sexually accessible manner. 86 Rather than
face additional harassment, Ellerth quit her job of fourteen
months. 87 The Court indicated that until Ellerth suffered actual job
detriment, her treatment could not be considered quid pro quo
sexual harassment:
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible
employment action resulted from a refusal to
submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she
establishes that the employment decision itself
constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII.

harassment occurred because of employee's sex). But see Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701
(explaining that in early cases, discrimination on basis of refusal to yield to sexual advances
was not viewed as discrimination because of sex). Of course, quid pro quo harassment can
be analogized to disparate treatment sex discrimination. The harassed employee's
employment relationship includes an additional term of employment-submission to a
supervisor's sexual advances-not required of employees of the opposite sex. See Michelle
Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 17,
39-40 {1998) ("Courts began to rule that Title VII was violated because submission to a sexual
act was made a condition of employment for a woman but not for a man; consequently, sexual
harassment was understood to be sexual discrimination 'because of a woman's gender.").
1111

86

524 u.s. 742 (1998).

Of particular note was Slowik's comment that he could make life easy or hard for
Ellerth at Burlington. Id. at 748. The Court concluded that a "trier of fact could find in
Slowik's remarks numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied some sexual
liberties." Id. at 751. Indeed, Slowik may have attempted to delay Ellerth's promotion by
commenting negatively on some of her personality traits. See id. at 748 C'Slowik expressed
resolutions during [a] promotion interview because [Ellerth] was not 'loose enough.'").
87
Id.
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For any sexual harassment preceding the
employment decision to be actionable, however,
the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Because
Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it
should be categorized as a hostile work
environment claim which requires a showing of
severe or pervasive conduct.88
Though the Court found that a reasonable factfinder could have
determined that Slowik explicitly threatened Ellerth's employment,
it concluded that Ellerth could not state a quid pro quo claim
because she had not suffered any tangible job detriment. Even
though Ellerth's fear that Slowik would hinder her career caused
her to quit after only fourteen months, likely hurting her career in
the short term, Ellerth's resignation did not constitute actual job
detriment. Presumably, the Court would require a claim akin to
constructive discharge for Ellerth's resignation to be deemed a
tangible job detriment. 89
The Ellerth Court certainly clarified exactly what quid pro quo
harassment is: sexual harassment resulting in actual job detriment.
The Court, however, by focusing on job detriment rather than the
terms of employment as the employee understood them, may have
fundamentally altered the quid pro quo harassment claim as well.
After Ellerth, quid pro quo harassment requires that threats
actually be fulfilled; the making of threats is no longer sufficient.
The Court minimized the importance of conditioning of job benefits
on sexual activity by eliminating the possibility that terms of
employment may be concretely altered by such conditioning alone. 90
11
118

Id.

Proof of a hostile work environment may not be sufficient to prove constructive
discharge. See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999)
("To show 'constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show more than just a Title VII violation
by her employer.'" (quoting Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998)));
see also Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that hostile
work environment can exist well before plaintiff is constructively discharged).
90
Other couru have suggested that the conditioning of job benefits on sexual activity is
a very important aspect of the harassment. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir.
1994) ("[W]e hold that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs whenever an individual
explicitly or implicitly conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon
an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct."); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 44 F.3d 773, 779
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The Court did this even though the conditioning of benefits on
sexual activity may cause the employee to react to the putative
change in terms of employment by acquiescing to the unwanted
harassment, resisting the harassment forcefully enough to cause the
supervisor to impose job detriment, or quitting the job.91 While the
Supreme Court may have merely been suggesting that actual job
detriment is conclusive proof that terms of employment had been
altered, its language suggests otherwise. Rather than indicate that
actual job detriment or any other competent proof would serve as
evidence that job benefits had been conditioned on sexual activity, 92
the Court noted explicitly that actual job detriment was necessary. 93
The Court's decision in Ellerth is clear. When the implications of
Ellerth and Oncale are combined, however, an interesting issue
regarding the scope of quid pro quo harassment arises. Before
Ellerth and Oncale, quid pro quo sexual harassment was typified by
and limited to a supervisor's advances to a subordinate that
concretely altered the terms of that subordinate's employment.
After Ellerth and Oncale, quid pro quo sexual harassment should be
considered actionable whenever non-acquiescence to sexual
harassment of any form results in tangible job detriment. 94 That
construct would allow any sexual harassment, including physical or

(2d Cir. 1994) ("[O]nce an employer conditions any terms of employment upon the employee's
submitting to unwelcome sexual advances, a quid pro quo claim is made out, regardless of
whether the employee (a) rejects the advances and suffers the consequences, or (b) submits
to the advances in order to avoid those consequences.''); Quarles v. McDuffie County, 949 F.
Supp. 846, 852 (S.D. Ga. 1996) ("Quid pro quo sexual harassment requires proof that
plaintiffs acceptance of the harassment is an express or implied condition to receiving a job
benefit or not receiving negative treatment.").
91
Indeed, even implicit conditioning of terms on sexual activity can be problematic. See
Nichols, 42 F.3d at 512 ("We note that difficult factual and legal questions will almost always
arise whenever either the conditioning ofbenefits (or absence of detriment) or the request for
favors is not explicit, but is instead implicit in the harasser's communications or dealings with
his prey.'').
92
Now that the focus of quid pro quo harassment is job detriment rather than the
conditioning of concrete job terms on sexual activity, quid pro quo harassment is quite similar
to disparate treatment sex discrimination. See infra Part IV.
93
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
s.c The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard and rejected this
theory before Ellerth was issued by the Supreme Court. See Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d
1266, 1274-75 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that generalized harassment could serve
to support quid pro quo claim when employee's refusal to acquiesce in such banter was reason
employee was terminated). The argument might fare differently now.
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verbal harassment from supervisors, co-workers, or anyone else in
the workplace, 95 to support a quid pro quo claim if actual job
detriment flowed from non-acquiescence to the harassment. For
example, giving less lucrative tables to a waitress who does not
allow customers to touch or grab her should amount to quid pro quo
sexual harassment if male waiters were not forced to endure such
harassment. 96 That such conduct should be treated as quid pro quo
sexual harassment is sensible because gender-based harassment
has caused actual job detriment. While the Supreme Court has not
yet ruled that quid pro quo harassment covers such conduct, no
doctrinal impediments exist to such a decision.
After Ellerth and Oncale, the quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim looks like a disparate treatment claim where the relevant
conduct amounts to sexual harassment. This simplification of sex
discrimination jurisprudence may expand liability under Title VII.
While the quid pro quo action will always involve a superior, as a
superior is the only person able to visit actual job detriment on an
employee, it may not be limited to situations where the superior has
engaged in the conduct that preceded the job detriment. Removing
this limitation may produce liability for any employment decision
related to harassment, rather than limiting recovery to situations
in which the superior's harassment led directly to the decision that
caused the job detriment.
Unfortunately, this will not yet help Susan Jones, our
hypothetical plaintiff. Her case is not a quid pro quo harassment
case because she does not appear to have suffered job detriment.
While her resignation may have been caused by her belief that she
would suffer tangible job detriment, the conduct involved is unlikely
to rise to the level of a constructive discharge. Additionally,

96

Sexual hara~mentinflicted by non-employees can support a sexual harassment claim.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1999) \An employer may also be responsible for the acts of nonemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.").
116
See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that advances by
customers should be considered workplace sexual harassment). This claim could be
considered akin to a hostile work environment claim because the environment literally
becomes hostile. The facts suggested, however, fit within the Court's simplified vision of quid
pro quo harassment.
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although the sentiments underlying her treatment were largely
unwelcome, the treatment itself is unlikely to be considered
harassing. 97
2. Hostile Work Environment Harassment. Hostile work
environment sexual harassment is relatively easy to define, but
difficult to describe precisely. 98 In general terms, hostile work
environment sexual harassment is unwelcome99 gender-motivated
harassment that constructively alters the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment without causing tangible job detriment. 100
The major legal distinction between hostile work environment and
quid pro quo harassment is that tangible job detriment is
unnecessary for a hostile work environment harassment claim. 101
The major practical distinction between the two types of claims is
that hostile work environment harassment must be severe or
pervasive 102 to be actionable. 108 Though the Supreme Court has
81
Although the distinction between harassing and merely discriminatory commenta may
be narrow, the comments Susan Jones faced appear to be clearly of the discriminatory type.
98
See Bernstein, supra note 54, at 448 (noting Supreme Court's general inability to
describe hostile work environment harassment adequately).
su Whether unwelcomeness should be required in hostile work environment cases is
debatable. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1729·32 (suggesting problems with unwelcomeness
requirement). Indeed, some have suggested abolishing unwelcomeness as an element of the
sexual harassment cause of action. See, e.g., Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 588
("The abandonment of the unwelcomeness requirement for sexual harassment claints would
serve to bring the law of sexual harassment into line with the law applicable to other
employment discrimination clainls under Title Vll."); Willborn, supra note 10, at 697·98
(stating that unwelcomeness is not element of harassment cause of action under
discrimination-centered model).
For a good discussion comparing unwelcomeness
requirement in the racial and sexual harassment areas, see L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing
Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 Omo ST. L.J. 819, 849-53 (1997)
[hereinafter Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex].
100
The elements of a hostile work environment are described more fully in other legal
commentary. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 72, at 411-15 (1996); see also Schultz, supra note
11, at 1714 ("The essence of a hostile work environment claim is that actions for which the
defendant is responsible have made the work environment more difficult for women (or men)
because of their sex."); White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 726-27 C'In Meritor, the Court
set forth a standard for determining when a hostile work environment will be present:
Unwelcome sexual conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to constitute a hostile
or abusive working environment will support a Title Vll claim.").
101
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751·52 (1998) (noting that distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment is concrete versus
constructive alteration of terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
102
The offending conduct need not be both severe and pervasive. See Smith v. Northwest
Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1997) C'The Meritor test is a disjunctive
one, requiring that the harassing conduct be sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently severe to
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ruled that an employee's terms ofemployment are not constructively
altered absent severe or pervasive harassment, the Court has not
indicated what conduct might be minimally sufficient to meet the
severe or pervasive standard, 104 even declining to determine
whether a single instance ofharassment is categorically insufficient
to support a hostile work environment claim. 105 The Court has
explained only that, in addition to being severe or pervasive,
actionable hostile work environment harassment must create an
environment that was subjectively problematic for the plaintiff and
would be objectively problematic for a reasonable person. 106

alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of Plaintiff's employment.").
103
Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing Ellerth, Faragher, and Oncale
as "hold[ing] that sexual harassment which does not culminate in an adverse employment
decision must, to create a hostile work environment, be severe or pervasive"); Deborah
Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based Discriminatory
(Mis)Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997).
Professor Epstein argues:
[A] plaintiff must show that the harassment is either severe or
pervasive. The required showing of severity varies inversely with
the pervasiveness of the abuse; because verbal harassment is
inherently less severe than ita physical counterpart, it will be
actionable only in extreme situations when it saturates a target's
work environment.
Id. at663.
104
The Court bas not set a clear standard; rather it bas set a fuzzy standard with clarity.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) \We have made it clear that
conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment[.]"); 'Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (noting that sexual harassment must be severe or
pervasive to be actionable).
105
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 ("[W]e accept the District Court's finding that the alleged
conduct was severe or pervasive.... The case before us involves numerous alleged threats,
and we express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment."); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22·23 (1993) (noting imprecise nature of determining what is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment); Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147
F .3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that in hostile work environment cases, context
matters and that incidents must be interpreted in context of workplace).
101
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Penry v. Federal Home Loan
Bank, ll'i5 F.3d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1998) (noting that hostile work environment must be
objectively and subjectively hostile); Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408
(lOth Cir. 1997) (indicating that workplace must be objectively and subjectively hostile). In
the hostile work environment context, courts appear to want to make certain that working
conditions are quite bad before an employer is held liable. See, e.g., Black v. Zaring Homes,
Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (overturning jury verdict because court was not
sufficiently offended by comments to find objectively hostile work environment).
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A work environment need not literally be "hostile" to support a
hostile work environment claim. As EEOC Guidelines note, hostile
work environment harassment includes conduct which "has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or create[s] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment." 107 Thus, a hostile work environment can be
viewed as simply one in which an employee has an unreasonably
more difficult time doing her job because of her gender. 108 Of course,
this does not require an employee to claim that her work became
substandard as a result of the harassment. 109 While an employee's
work might be more difficult to do because of harassment or
workplace atmosphere, it may clearly remain of good quality. 110
The harm of a hostile work environment is not merely the impact
that the harassment may have on the employee's work, it is also in
the toll that such harassment can take on the employee's psyche. 111
Both physical stress and mental distress often accompany hostile
work environment harassment. Indeed, until Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 112 some courts believed that severe emotional distress
was required before a hostile work environment claim was
cognizable. 113 Fortunately, the Harris Court held that psychological
107

Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(a)(3) (1999)).
This is one way to prove that a hostile work environment exists. See Harris, 510 U.S.
at 23 (noting that proving harassment interfered with employee's work performance is
method of proving that hostile work environment exists); Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow
Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that key issue in hostile work
environment case is whether employee suffered disadvantageous terms of employment
because of sex); Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Wainer & Assocs., 866 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (N.D. Ill.
1994) ("In order to constitute sexual harassment, a plaintiffs work environment must
unreasonably interfere with her work performance or be intimidating, hostile or offensive.").
100
See Smith, 129 F.3d at 1413 (ruling that "plaintiff is not required to prove that her
tangible productivity or work performance declined or that her ability to do her job was
impaired by [harassment]").
110
Complaining that one's work conditions are inferior does not necessarily indicate that
one's work was substandard. In Faragher, Ellerth, and Vinson, the plaintiffs' workplace
atmospheres appeared to be hostile, though each appears to have been a competent employee.
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (noting that Faragher had worked at her job for five years);
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748 (noting that Ellerth had received promotion prior to quitting due to
harassment); Vinson, 477 U.S. at 59·60 (indicating that Vinson was repeatedly promoted on
merit alone).
111
Bernstein, supra note 54, at 462; Epstein, supra note 72, at 405.
liZ 510 u.s. 17 (1993).
113
I d. at 20 (noting that Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve split among circuits
regarding whether serious psychological harm is required to state hostile work environment
108
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distress is merely one factor to consider in determining if an
employee has been subjected to a hostile work environment. 114
Hostile work environment harassment and quid pro quo
harassment have traditionally described different workplace
problems. 116 Quid pro quo harassment has traditionally focused on
the explicit trading of sex for the avoidance ofjob detriment, while
hostile work environment harassment has traditionally focused on
an employee's reaction to environmental harassment in the
workplace. This traditional distinction is illustrated in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 116 where the Supreme Court first
recognized the viability of a hostile work environment claim. In
Vinson, the Court recounted plaintiff Mechelle Vinson's testimony
that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, made sexual advances toward
her, fondled her, and raped her on several occasions. 117 Though
Vinson testified that she had, after initially refusing Taylor's
advances, agreed to have sexual relations with him, she indicated
that she did so out of fear oflosing her job. 118 Taylor denied that he
made any inappropriate comments, sexual advances, or engaged in
any sexual activity with Vinson. 119 The conduct alleged in Vinson
did not constitute quid pro quo harassment because, according to
the Court, no concrete terms or conditions of employment were
conditioned on Vinson's acquiescence to sexual activity and no
economic harm in the form of reduced job benefits flowed from the
putative harassment. 120

claim).
114
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 ("The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.
But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no
single factor is required.").
115
But see Franke, supra note 54, at 691 (suggesting that hostile work environment
harassment in toto .items from disparate treatment discrimination); White, Nothing Special,
supra note 2, at 729 (suggesting that disparate treatment analysis should generally guide
analysis of all sexual harassment claims).
JIG 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
117
Id. at 60.
m Id.
119
Id. at 61.
120
Vinson apparently received all promotions to which she was entitled. See id. at 59·60
(documenting Vinson's promotion pattern).
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Although the Court was uncertain whether sexual advances
occurred and whether they were unwelcome even ifthey did occur, 121
it determined that Vinson's hostile work environment claim was
viable since the conduct Vinson charged appeared to be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constructively alter the terms or conditions of
Vinson's employment, if proven. 122 Mechelle Vinson's working
conditions may have included demands for sex, explicit sexual
advances, and more subtle signals suggesting that part of her
function was to be sexually available to her supervisor. Although
her terms of employment may not have been explicitly altered, they
may have been discriminatorily provided because Vinson had to
endure such working conditions because she was a woman.
The lesson of Vinson seemed relatively simple. Repeatedly
requesting sexual favors from an employee without more could
constitute hostile work environment harassment because of the
effect it could have on the employee's working conditions; repeatedly
demanding sexual favors from a subordinate and linking concrete
job benefits to those favors could constitute quid pro quo
harassment precisely because of the linkage of sex to explicit terms
of employment. 123
Despite the Vinson Court's lesson, the Ellerth Court
distinguished quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment based on whether the conduct charged caused actual job
detriment. As a result, hostile work environment harassment can
be divided into two types: pre-quid pro quo and atmospheric. I call
one type pre-quid pro quo harassment because it is functionally
equivalent to quid pro quo harassment and is exemplified by

121
According to Vinson, Taylor stopped harassing Vinson once she began dating someone
else. ld. at 60.
122
See id. at 67 (noting that Vinson's allegations were "plainly sufficient to state a claim
for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment"). Of course, if the facts in Vinson were changed
slightly, the plaintiff could have demonstrated quid pro quo harassment. For example, had
Taylor fired Vinson in response to a refusal to engage in sexual relations with him, as Vinson
feared, the case would have been a quid pro quo harassment case.
123
Note that sexual harassment need not be sexualized. See supra Part N.A. Indeed,
some commentators suggest that sexualizing the hostile work environment is problematic.
See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1710 (suggesting that sexualization of hostile work
environment obscures "some of the most pervasive forms of gender hostility experienced on
a day-to-day basis by many women (and men) in the workplace").
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unfulfilled threats to an employee's terms of employment. 124 I call
the other type atmospheric harassment because it is exemplified by
a working environment that is sufficiently ingrained with sexual
advances, sex-based discrimination, or manifestations of gender
inequality or hostility to effectively alter the conditions of the
employee's employment because of sex. 125
a. Pre-Quid Pro Quo Harassment. Pre-quid pro quo
harassment is identical to quid pro quo sexual harassment, except
that pre-quid pro quo harassment does not yield actual job
detriment. 126 Unfulfilled gender-motivated threats to concrete
terms of employment, at most, constitute pre-quid pro quo hostile
work environment harassment. 127 For example, a supervisor who
tells a subordinate, "Sleep with me or I will make sure you never get
another promotion," but who does not act on the threat, only
engages in pre-quid pro quo harassment. 128 This clarifies the
relationship between quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment. If quid pro quo harassment encompasses the
conditioning of concrete terms of employment on sexual activity, as

124
See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747·48 (1998) (finding that Ellerth
received demands that "could be construed as threats to deny her tangible job benefits").
126
See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998) (noting that
Faragher's work environment included demeaning comments and unwanted touching);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (describing extensive
harassment, including repeated anonymous postings of nude calendars in workplace).
126
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. The Court noted:
Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as
quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual
remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
work environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation
between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they
are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited
utility.
!d.
127
Interestingly, the trial court in Ellerth indicated that there was a quid pro quo
component to Ellerth's claim. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1121 (N.D. Ill.
1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was split on whether
Ellerth had proven a quid pro quo claim. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d
490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997).
121
A similar threat was made in Faragher. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 ("Date me or
clean the toilets for a year."). The impact of the threat on the plaintiffs employment was
unclear.
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some courts have suggested it should, 129 the above threat would
support a quid pro quo claim. 130 That such a threat, if unfulfilled,
is only sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim
cements the notion that the concreteness of the harm visited upon
an employee is the sole distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
work environment harassment.
The impact of the "severe or pervasive" requirement on pre-quid
pro quo claims further supports this point.
Severity or
pervasiveness is required to ensure that the employee's terms of
employment have sufficiently changed when no actual job detriment
has occurred. The "severe or pervasive" requirement thus acts as a
proxy for actual job detriment in the pre-quid pro quo harassment
context. However, the severity or pervasiveness of the subject
threat may not have any impact on whether a credible threat
convinces the employee that the terms of her employment have
changed. Indeed, pervasive threats that are not fulfilled may, over
time, appear to the employee to be less likely to be fulfilled, and may
become less credible.
When credible threats are made in the pre-quid pro quo context,
little reason exists to question whether the terms of employment
have actually changed. 131 The terms of employment change, at least
in an employee's mind, when one's supervisor, who may be

129
See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that implicit
suggestion that job benefits were based on sexual activity constitutes quid pro quo
harassment); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
employee who acquiesces to unwelcome sexual advances may state quid pro quo claim when
"the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual
advances"); see also Jansen, 123 F .3d at 499 (Flaum, J., concurring) (noting that "a clear and
serious quid pro quo threat alters the 'terms and conditions' of employment in such a way as
to violate Title VII and therefore can constitute an actionable claim even ifthe threat remains
unfulfilled").
130
Whether credible or not, the threat also might be part of a general atmospheric hostile
work environment claim. In Oncale and Faragher, threats of this sort were part of a hostile
work environment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 u.s. 75, 77 (1998).
131
Ofcourse, any inappropriate request from a supervisor may appear to carry an implied
threat. See Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With
Particular Application To Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1081 (1999) C'In the
case of solicitation by a supervisor, the obvious explanation for why the 'offer' is resented is
that it often carries with it an implied threat to fire or otherwise discriminate against the
woman if she refuses. The resentment may be a product of the threat rather than of the
solicitation per se.").
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empowered to change the terms of employment, says that the terms
have changed. If a supervisor credibly asserts that the terms of
employment have changed, that no actual job detriment has
occurred does not mean that the terms have not changed; 132 it
means that the supervisor has not acted to effectuate the changed
terms. Simply, a term of employment can be altered through
harassment that may be considered neither severe nor pervasive in
a colloquial sense. 133
The concerns attending unfulfilled threats to employment are
akin to those accompanying quid pro quo harassment. Consider
those situations in which a supervisor does not have the opportunity
or need to fulfill a threat (i.e., when an employee quits or acquiesces
to the advances). 134 In those cases, the harasser may get what he
wants without acting on the threat. If the employee acquiesces, the

132

It cannot be the case that the terms, conditions or privileges of employment do not
change until the supervisor acts on the threats. Assume that a supervisor offers jobs to two
secretarial applicants, one male and one female with annual salaries of$30,000 and $20,000,
respectively, for no reason other than gender. Ifboth applicants accept the offers, the terms
of the female secr•~tary's offer will be discriminatory even before she receives her first
paycheck. While a court might limit some portion of her damages to salary accrued, surely
that court would not suggest that the terms of the female secretary's agreement might not
be discriminatory because her boss might pay her a $30,000 salary. To further illustrate,
consider a hypothetical university where men are required to produce four articles before
being tenured while women are required to produce five articles before being tenured. At that
university, women are being discriminated against even before a specific job detriment visits
a particular plaintiff. Although damages may be difficult to calculate, a female employee who
produces five articles and is granted tenure is still a victim of sex discrimination. Similarly,
in the context of Ellerth, little suggests that the terms of Ellerth's employment were not
actually changedjust because Slowik might not have successfully halted Ellerth's promotions.
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 1524 U.S. 7 42, 748 (1998) (noting that Slowik raised concerns
about Ellerth possibly in attempt to halt her promotion).
133
For example, the threat that Faragher needed to date her supervisor or clean the
toilets for a year might be deemed neither severe nor pervasive. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
The severity is only apparent if the threat is fulfilled. In that case, however, the harassment
is quid pro quo harassment. Some might answer that being forced to prove severity or
pervasiveness is likely not a problem when a supervisor's threat is credible. Not only is this
argument not at all clear, it is beside the point. After Title Vlfs enactment, a woman should
not be forced to deal with threats to her employment based on her willingness to engage in
sexual activity, let alone be forced to gauge which threats are severe or pervasive enough to
be actionable.
134
Mechelle Vinson may have acquiesced to what she believed to be implicit threats;
Kimberly Ellerth quit. Both claimed harm, though neither of their supervisors needed to
fulfill the threats to their employment. See supra notes 85-89, 114-120 and accompanying text
(outlining factual scenarios of these two cases).
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harasser engages in desired sexual activity; 135 if the employee quits,
the harasser need not interact with the sexually unavailable
subordinate. In either case, an employee's terms of employment
have been altered because her supervisor provided a discriminatory
term. The supervisor's dominion and control over the employee is
precisely the concern accompanying quid pro quo harassment, 136
where the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct is not
particularly important. This concern is particularly salient when
the harassment is severe or pervasive enough to influence that
employee into acquiescing or quitting, but not severe or pervasive
enough to change the terms or conditions of employment according
to a court or jury. 137 Some have noted that whether the employee
submits to the harassment or quits ultimately depends on economic
factors that may be unrelated to the severity or pervasiveness of the
harassment. 138
The Court has determined that pre-quid pro quo harassment is
hostile work environment harassment, even though it looks like
quid pro quo harassment. This determination makes clear that the
old ways of thinking of quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment may no longer be useful. 139 Rather than differentiating

1116
Giving a harasser any leeway to harass in this situation is surely unfair. Cf. Karibian
v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 773 (2d Cir. 1994} ("Under the district court's rationale, only
the employee who successfully resisted the threat of sexual blackmail could state a quid pro
quo claim. We do not read Title VII to punish the victims of sexual harassment who
surrender to unwelcome sexual encounters. Such a rule would only encourage harassers to
increase their persistence."}.
1116
The fear or discomfort that accompanies the threat is a concern. See Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1997} (Flaum, J., concurring} C'A
supervisor's unambiguous communication that adverse job action is imminent ifsexual favors
are not forthcoming causes the employee real emotional strife.").
181
Cf. Breeding v. Arthur Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999} \We
conclude that the conditions of which Ms. Breeding complains, even if they make out a basis
for a sexual harassment hostile environment claim, do not amount to sufficient evidence to
support a finding of constructive discharge."}.
138
See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994} (noting that even when
facing harassment "[f]or economic reasons, most workers cannot simply abandon their
employment-new jobs are hard to find"}.
1119
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-54 (1998} (suggesting that old
distinctions between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment are not as stark
as has been suggested); see also White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 730 (suggesting that
distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment should be dropped, with focus
being on whether harassment has resulted in tangible job detriment}.
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quid pro quo and hostile work environment discrimination based on
the style of the supervisor's conduct, the Court focuses solely on the
effect the conduct has on the employee's job. This focus suggests
that quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment are
essentially the same cause of action with slight variations, rather
than fundamentally different causes of action.
b. Atmospheric Harassment. In contrast to quid pro quo and
pre-quid pro quo harassment, which often focus on specific incidents
of harassment, atmospheric harassment focuses on the employee's
overall working environment. An atmospheric hostile work
environment claim may lie when a particular employee or group of
employees is unwelcome, 140 welcome only under certain
discriminatory conditions, treated as irrelevant or treated as sexual
objects, or when their working environment is such that the
employees labor under qualitatively different terms of employment
because of gender. 141 As the EEOC noted, and the Supreme Court
echoed, "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult." 142 When such intimidation, ridicule, or insult occurs because
of sex and results in discriminatory terms of employment, the Title
VII prohibition against sex discrimination is implicated.
Atmospheric harassment can appear quite different from prequid pro quo harassment because it can easily stem from gender
hostility rather than sexual attraction, 143 and may not involve

140

See Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 569 (noting that harassment can be
concrete method of indicating that women are not welcome in particular workplace).
141
See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that discriminatory
atmosphere can alter terms, conditions or privileges of employment).
141
Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing EEOC Guidelines); see
also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (noting that Title VII does not tolerate
workplaces that are "permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' ").
143
Of course, the desire to treat women as sexual beings may stem from the same desire
to drive them out of the workplace. Sometimes it is unclear which desire motivates specific
harassing conduct. Fremling and Posner note: "When men want to drive women out of the
workplace, they sometimes do so by flaunting symbols of male sexuality, as by using obscene
language, exhibiting their genitalia, and posting pornographic photographs." Fremling &
Posner, supra note 131, at 1085. Of course, sexual harassment may be designed generally to
make women feel uncomfortable and incompetent in certain workplaces. See Schultz, supra
note 11, at 1687 (noting that many forms of sexual harassment are meant "to undermine ...
female colleagues' perceived (or sometimes even actual) competence to do the work~).
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sexual advances. 144 Gender-motivated harassment from any source,
including co-workers, subordinates, or customers, may support an
atmospheric hostile work environment harassment claim. 145 Of
course, the harassment must be severe or pervasive to be actionable.
In the atmospheric harassment context, the severe or pervasive
requirement makes sense because the severity or pervasiveness of
the harassment is directly related to how different an employee's
working conditions are from her male co-workers. The difference in
working conditions constitutes the constructive alteration of the
terms of employment.
That a workplace is rife with sexual commentary, sexual
innuendo, or sexual advances, however, does not render it sexually
hostile for sexual harassment purposes. 146 Rather, a hostile work
environment is one in which the workplace atmosphere amounts to
a discriminatory term of employment for a particular employee or
group of employees because of their sex. 147 Though a workplace
atmosphere may be common to all employees (or may not be if a
particular employee is targeted for harassment), the sexually hostile
workplace imposes more difficult working conditions on the
complaining employee than on other employees. 148 Even if men and
women co-exist in a sexually charged workplace, the nature of the

144
At times, of course, it does. See generally Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57; Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that plaintiff was propositioned by several coworkers and supervisors).
146
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(e) (1999) (noting that employer may be deemed responsible for
harassing acts of non-employees).
146
Some commentators seem to disagree. See Kimball E. Gilmer & Jeffrey M. Anderson,
Zero Tolerance For God?: Religious Expression in the Workplace After Ellerth and Faragher,
42 How. L.J. 327 (1999) (arguing generally that Ellerth and Faragher express preference for
zero tolerance).
147
See MAcKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 209 (noting that sexual
harassment can become condition of work because it effectively places additional burdens on
women in workplace).
148
The workplace described in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991), was rife with atmospheric harassment and exemplified a hostile workplace.
In Robinson, plaintiff Lois Robinson and her female co-workers were constantly exposed to
language and conduct that indicated that a woman's primary function in life was to be a
sexual partner and that a woman's primary function at the job site was to provide
entertainment for male workers. Though most of the conduct amounted to comments and
non-physical conduct, such as the posting of pictures, the actions were designed to keep the
workplace a boy's club. See id. at 1493 (noting that one male employee referred to subject
workplace as a boy's club).
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harassment may affect employees of one gender differently than
employees of the other gender. 149 Indeed, employees of the same
gender may feel differently about the hostility of a particular
workplace. 150
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 151 the Supreme Court
described a workplace where comments and physical conduct were
sufficiently offensive to yield a hostile work environment. 152 In
Faragher, the offensive conduct consisted of "repeatedly subjecting
. . . female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching, . . .
making lewd remarks, and . . . speaking of women in offensive
terms." 153 On one occasion, plaintiffBethAnn Faragher was tackled
by one of her supervisors and told that "but for a physical
characteristic [the supervisor] found unattractive, he would readily
have had sexual relations with her." 154 In addition, individual
supervisors often made reference to wanting to have sex with
particular subordinate female lifeguards, and generally discussed
women's bodies around female lifeguards. 1515 The trial court
determined that the conduct was not merely annoying; it severely

149
See Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 574-75 (noting that sexualized
workplace common to both sexes may harm women more than men).
1110
Different people may experience discrimination differently. The same conduct can be
welcome by some employees, but unwelcome to other employees of the same sex. See, e.g.,
Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 460 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that
conduct that one female employee found flattering another female employee found harassing).
151
524 u.s. 775 (1998).
152
Egregious, but less severe, conduct can be actionable. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1998) (describing conduct consisting of inappropriate sexual comments
and suggestive carfssing); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (describing, as
potentially actionable, conduct consisting largely of derogatory comments and incidents,
including company president's request that female employees retrieve coins from his pants
pocket).
153
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 780.
IM Id. at 782; se.~ also Abieta v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 248-49 (6th
Cir. 1998) (describing hostile work environment where comments consisted generally of desire
to have sex with other women).
1115
Many cases involving similar conduct exist. See, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164
F.3d 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1999) (detailing conduct that included talk from employee's
supervisors about employee's body, invitations to have sex, and other talk of sexual nature,
but not including touchings); Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257,
1260·61 (lOth Cir. 1998) (relating that supervisor made comments about female body parts
in general and engaged in relatively minor touching of plaintiff); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc.,
104 F.3d 822, 826-27 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting comments made were disrespectful of women in
general and indicated juvenile obsession with female body parts).
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affected plaintiffs working conditions and work. 156 Because the
conduct was undertaken because of sex and resulted in
discriminatory work conditions, the Supreme Court ratified the trial
court's conclusion that the plaintiff had pled a hostile work
environment. 157
As should be clear from Faragher, workplace atmosphere is
shaped by all workplace conduct. Thus, atmospheric harassment
need not be directed invariably at a particular employee to support
that employee's atmospheric harassment claim. 158 In fact, one of the
first cases dealing with a racial hostile work environment (a
precursor to sexual hostile work environment) was brought by an
employee who was aggrieved by conduct directed at customers of her
race rather than at her. 1159 While the term "harassment" may seem
to require the intent to harass or at least an intent to affect a
particular employee, the term may not always have that connotation
in the context of hostile work environment discrimination. When
conduct creates a hostile work environment, the motivation of those
engaging in the harassing conduct may be irrelevant. 160 Rather
uss See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 783 (finding conduct "alter[ed] the conditions of Faragher's
employment and constitut[ed] an abusive working environment").
157
See id. at 786 (ruling in Faragher's favor).
1158
See Black, 104 F.3d at 826 (mentioning that most comments, though generally
offensive, were not directed at plaintiff); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415·16
(lOth Cir. 1987) (noting that harassment not directed at plaintiff may be used to prove hostile
work environment claim); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that
harassment need not be directed at plaintiff to be cognizable); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting generally that conduct need not be aimed specifically at
employee to result in discriminatory hostile work environment with respect to employee);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (detailing
activity not exclusively aimed at plaintiff). That many comments were not directed at
plaintiff may affect the likelihood that an environment will be found to be objectively hostile.
See Black, 104 F.3d at 826 ("[W]e note that in this case most of the comments were not
directed at plaintiff; this fact contributes to our conclusion that the conduct here was not
severe enough to create an objectively hostile environment.").
159
Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234. While racial and sexual hostile work environment
harassment can be analogized, comparing them can also be tricky. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at
787 n.1 ("Although racial and sexual harassment will often take different forms, and
standards may not be entirely interchangeable, we think there is good sense in seeking
generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment.");
MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 127-41 (comparing approaches to sex
discrimination and race discrimination); see also Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex, supra
note 99 (suggesting that, due to differences between racial and sexual harassment,
analogizing them can lead to improper characterization of both).
160
Some commentators suggest that not only should intent be relevant, but comments
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than focusing on a co-worker's intent, the issue is what effect the
harassment had on the complaining employee's working
conditions. 161 If the result of the harassment is the discriminatory
provision of terms of an employee's employment because of sex, an
atmospheric harassment claim may lie. 162
A collection of small and large indignities may yield an
environment in which the complaining employee may not thrive
because of gender discrimination. 163 That comments combined with
fairly minor physical contact164 or lewd and offensive remarks
alone 165 may be sufficient to create an actionable hostile work
should not be actionable unless directed at the plaintiff. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, What
Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997)
(arguing that only targeted speech should be actionable as harassment).
181
See Maatman, supra note 11, at 74-75 \A harasser's objections that no harm was
meant are irrelevant in determining whether a hostile environment has been created: the
Meritor and Harris standards focus nearly exclusively on the effect of the harasser's acts, and
not on their intended purpose or motivation.").
182
See Bundy, 6 U F .2d at 934; Rogers, 454 F.2d at234. The constructive alteration occurs
if the employee endures conditions that employees of the opposite gender do not face or the
employee endures conditions she would not have to face were she a man.
183
See Abieta v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting
that even relatively mild statements can create hostile work environment if"commonplace,
ongoing, and continual"); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 934; Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234; Robinson, 760 F.
Supp. at 1486; J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environment, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295,
2297 (1999) ("Even if individual acts do not constitute a hostile environment separately, they
can be actionable when taken together.j.
JM This reference is not meant to suggest that undesired touching is appropriate; rather
it is meant to suggest that some kinds of unwanted physical contact in the workplace are far
more offensive than others. Compare Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60-61
(1986), and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780,782, with Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
747-48 (1998), and Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1993).
186
Many reported cases exist where no touching has occurred, but speech and conduct
were sexual. E.g., Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1998); Smith v.
Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1417 (lOth Cir. 1997) (noting that hostile
work environment claim does not require physical conduct or touching); see also Cecilee PriceHuish, "Because thE Constitution Demands It": Specific Speech Injunctive Relief for Title VII
Hostile Work Environment Claims, 7 WM. &MARYBILLRTS. J. 193, 194-97 (1998) (suggesting
that words alone can easily create hostile work environment). Indeed, same-sex harassment
may generally invo1ve commentary rather than physical acts. See William E. Foote & Jane
Goodman-Delahunty, Same-Sex Harassment: Implications ofthe Oncale Decision for Forensic
Evaluation of Plaintiffs, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 123, 130 (1999) \When same-sex harassment
occurs among males, it is most often verbal in nature. Incidents involving put-downs,
homosexual epithets, and similar statements occur ten times more often than incidents
involving sexual touching or coercion."); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1700 (noting Carroll
Brodsky's suggestion that sexual harassment can take form of"men teasing other men about
sexual potency or interest"). Conversely, same-sex harassment can also involve physical
harassment of the most offensive type. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
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environment has disturbed some commentators. 166 However, that
multiple minor indignities can create an actionable hostile work
environment is consistent with the notion that atmospheric
harassment relates more to overarching workplace conditions than
isolated harassing acts. 167 Hostile work environment harassment is
more about whether the employee feels disadvantaged each time she
enters her workplace than about whether she is harassed
episodically or periodically. Consequently, a hostile workplace can
be created by incidents that might not be actionable if pled
individually. 168
Whether a workplace drips with sexual hostility, sexual
commentary, sexual desire, or some combination of all three, the
critical inquiry is whether the individual employee's working
conditions have been adversely affected. Related to that concern is
whether the workplace atmosphere is one in which all employees
can thrive, regardless of gender. 169 That Title VII prohibits an

523 U.S. 75 (1997) (recognizing same-sex harassment claim based on sexual harassment by
heterosexual men); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S.
1001 (1998).
186
See Epstein, supra note 72, at 400 n.8 (citing articles criticizing harassment law on
First Amendment grounds); Volokh, supra note 160, at 627 n.2 (noting articles discussing
First Amendment concerns with restricting workplace speech even in context of hostile work
environment discrimination). Commentators, however, have answered the attacks. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, supra note 54, at 517-19 (noting possible co-existence of respect demanded by
sexual harassment law and First Amendment protections); Epstein, supra note 72, at 400
("The implicit holding of the Bundy case-that speech alone can create a discriminatory
hostile work environment-went unquestioned for many years."); Willborn, supra note 10, at
719.
167
See, e.g., Bundy, 641 F.2d at 940 (noting that essence of hostile work environment was
propositioning and harassing that was "standard operating procedure" in workplace).
188
In Draper, the court described plaintiffs work environment:
Here, Draper has testified that she was subject to the same sort of
harassment by Anelli on a regular basis, and that she constantly felt
uncomfortable and upset at work. As in most claims of hostile work
environment harassment, the discriminatory acts were not always
of a nature that could be identified individually as significant events;
instead, the day-to-day harassment was primarily significant, both
as a legal and as a practical matter, in its cumulative effect.
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108; Balkin, supra note 163. Hostile work environment harassment can
be less about driving women away from the workplace and more about keeping women "in
their place" in the workplace. See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 9-23
(noting generally that harassment is used to keep women in lower position in workplace);
Franke, supra note 54, at 693 ("Sexual harassment is a technology of sexism.").
168
See Epstein, supra note 72, at 405 (noting physical and psychological problems that can

2000]

SEX DISCRIMINATION

1631

employer from creating or tolerating an environment in which an
employee or group of employees cannot be expected to thrive due to
their gender is no surprise given Title VII's goal of the elimination
of all discriminatory workplace barriers. 170
Atmospheric harassment is not just about an individual employee
taking offense at poor treatment in the workplace. 171 The hostile
work environment must make it more difficult, either physically or
emotionally, for the employee to do her job because of her gender. 172
In short, workplace conduct can effectively alter the conditions of an
employee's employment even when the employer or supervisor does
not explicitly change the terms of employment. Because the
employer is generally responsible for the workplace atmosphere, it
may be liable when that workplace becomes hostile when the
employer knew or should have known about the harassing
conduct. 173
accompany sexual harassment).
170
See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of gender, and seeks to remove arbitrary barriers to
sexual equality at the workplace ... .''); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1796 ("From the beginning,
the central purpose of [Title VII's} ... prohibition against sex discrimination has been to
enable everyone-regardless of their identities as men or women, or their personae as
masculine or feminine-to pursue their chosen endeavors on equal, empowering terms.").
171
Ofcourse, actionable sexual harassment does cause offense. See Bernstein, supra note
154, at 462 (noting that hostile work environment harassment is about "disturbance of inner
equilibrium, a notion inherently connected to emotional turmoil").
172
This can be a problem even when the complaining employee is a supervisor or
manager. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 11, at 1722-23 (describing case in which woman
subforeman was harassed out of her job by subordinates who wanted male subforeman).
Regardless of the employee involved, atmospheric harassment may lead to lower work
performance which may, in turn, lead to the inability to share in tangible job benefits (such
as promotion) or tc· an employee's resignation or termination. See id. at 1764 (noting that
harassment may lead to poor performance that can seem to legitimize employee's failure to
advance). Even though one need not allege that one's actual work production suffered in
order to state a claim, atmospheric harassment creates conditions under which an employee
may not thrive because of her gender.
173
See White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 742 (detailing Supreme Court's standard
for employer liability after Ellerth and Faragher). Given that supervisors act as the employer
for workplace discipline, it seems an unusual workplace in which a responsible supervisor did
not know that atmospheric sexual harassment was occurring. Ofcourse, when the supervisor
helps create the ho.itile work environment, charging the employer with vicarious knowledge
of the hostile work environment may not make sense. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 810 (1998) (declining to determine propriety of court of appeals's refusal to find
employer was vicariously knowledgeable about hostile work environment created by
supervisors). But see Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting
that where workplace is isolated from headquarters, employer may be liable for hostile work
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Unfortunately, our hypothetical plaintiff Susan Jones probably
does not have an actionable hostile work environment claim. AB
noted earlier, it is unlikely that the conduct she was subjected to
amounted to unwelcome harassment sufficient to support a sexual
harassment claim. 174 This is worrisome given that the harm that
Susan Jones suffered was very similar to the harm suffered by
plaintiffs pleading actionable hostile work environment claims.
Based on the conduct involved, Susan believed that her
opportunities would likely be limited by the gender-motivated
conduct of those around her. Her choice was similar to that faced by
Kimberly Ellerth: acquiesce or quit. 175
Any emotional stress Susan Jones suffered as a result of her
treatment would likely be sufficient to sustain a hostile work
environment claim were she able to plead such a claim. 176 Because
neither actual job detriment nor severe psychological harm is
required for hostile work environment liability, Susan's legitimate
fear of being denied job benefits would be sufficient to yield an

environment harassment engaged in by supervisors even where commanders at headquarters
were unaware of supervisors' harassment). Of course, a supervisor may know that gendermotivated activity is occurring, without recognizing the conduct as harassment. In that case,
the inquiry should shift to whether the supervisor should have known that the conduct
amounted to harassment.
174
See supra Part III.
115
Had the conduct involved been harassing, Susan Jones surely would be able to state
an actionable hostile work environment claim. For instance, had Susan been told repeatedly
that she would not become a partner at PW unless she slept with a partner, she would surely
be able to state a hostile work environment claim. Susan would arguably be in precisely the
position Ellerth was, believing that she has to quit or become more sexually accessible.
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-49 (1998). In such an instance, Susan would
have suffered the same type, if not amount, of damage as in the hypothetical.
Precisely what kind of conduct is actionable is somewhat unclear. Some student
commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has not demarcated any lines; it is not
clear what type ofconduct falls short of actionable harassment under Title Vll. See, e.g., John
Davidson Miller III, Note, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Actionable Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Is This the End ofHorseplay as We Know It?, 29 SETON HALLL. REv.
787, 811 (1998) (suggesting difficulty in distinguishing when "ordinary socializing" becomes
offensive socializing that creates hostile work environment); Wendy M. Parr, Case note, When
Does Male-on-Male Horseplay Become Discrimination Because ofSex?: Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Incorporated, 25 Omo N.U. L. REV. 87 (1999) (suggesting Oncale decision
did not clarify when horseplay stops and hostile work environment begins).
176
See Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1997)
(instructing that to state hostile work environment claim "[i]t is sufficient that Plaintiffs
testimony reflects that [supervisor's] comments were intolerable, publicly made, and caused
humiliation and a loss of self-respect").
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actionable claim. 177 Susan's fear was reasonable if the comments
from PW's partners and employees reflected the reality of PW's
partnership selection process. 178 Her damages would simply depend
on the stress she faced. 179
C. REALIGNING SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The Supreme Court's recent sexual harassment rulings have
realigned the e.exual harassment causes of action. The Court's focus
on the necessity of actual job detriment to support quid pro quo
harassment has produced three varieties ofharassmentclaims, quid
pro quo, pre-quid pro quo, and hostile work environment. Pre-quid
pro quo harassment and atmospheric hostile work environment
combine to define hostile work enVironment harassment as
actionable sexual harassment that does not yield actual job
detriment. This realignment helps focus the Court's position
regarding quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.
Before the realignment, quid pro quo and hostile work
environment harassment were fundamentally different causes of
action, though some conduct could support either. 180 Quid pro quo
harassment focused on the concrete terms of an employee's
relationship with the employer; hostile work environment focused
on an employee's relationship to the workplace. That an employer
or supervisor had determined that concrete job terms would depend
on its employee's willingness to have sex was the essence of a quid
pro quo claim. Conversely, that supervisors, co-workers, and others
continually pestered an employee for sex, treated her like a sexual
177
Severe emotional stress is not required. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., tHO U.S. 17,
24 (1993) (stating that "conduct need not severely affect [the employee's] pyschological well·
being"); Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1998)
C'While the plaintiff must make a showing that the environment was both objectively and
subjectively hostile, she need not demonstrate psychological harm, nor is she required to show
that her work suffured as a result of the harassment.").
178
Prior PW employment decisions might be sufficient to create the stress that supports
a hostile work environment claim (Le., the fear that non-conformity might lead to a negative
employment decision).
179
See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 253 (1994) (holding that Title VII
plaintiff may recover damages for emotional harm).
1110
See Meritor Save. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (allowing sexual advances to
support hostile work environment claim).
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object, or simply made it more difficult for her to do her job because
she was a woman was the essence of a hostile work environment
claim. Today, because quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment are distinguished merely by the existence or nonexistence of actual job detriment, they are essentially the same
cause of action with a marginally meaningful distinction. 181 As we
see in the next Part, that redefinition has serious implications for
the future of sexual harassment law.

V.

DISPARATE TREATMENT AND SEXUAL HARAsSMENT

A. REAIJGNING DISPARATE TREATMENT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Although both disparate treatment discrimination and sexual
harassment constitute sex discrimination, they have been treated as
distinct forms of sex discrimination. 182 Disparate treatment
discrimination generally describes an employment decision made
because of an employee's sex; 183 sexual harassment generally
describes unwelcome gender-motivated harassment that culminates
in the discriminatory provision of terms of employment. 184 The
Supreme Court's recent elimination of the doctrinal distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment
coupled with its expansion of the type of conduct that can support
a sexual harassment claim has eliminated much of the distinction
between disparate treatment discrimination and quid pro quo
sexual harassment. 185 Sexual harassment now includes any gender-

181

See Gilmer & Anderson, supra note 146, at 338 (suggesting that because the Court has
eliminated distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment there
may be more sexual harassment lawsuits in future).
182
See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999)
(differentiating sex discrimination and sexual harassment); Holtz v. Marcus Theatres, 31 F.
Supp. 2d 1139 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (treating sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims
as requiring different forms of proof). That disparate treatment and sexual harassment are
subsumed by Title VII means that some similarity exists between them. This similarity,
however, need not mean that they are very similar.
183
See supra Part IT.
ta.c Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serve., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
188
See generally White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 725 (discussing treating
disparate treatment and sexual harassmeni; similarly); Willborn, supra note 10, at 677
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motivated harassment that can support an inference of
discrimination. 186 Thus, disparate treatment discrimination consists
of gender-based conduct, treatment, or decisions resulting in actual
job detriment; 187 quid pro quo sexual harassment consists of genderbased harassment that results in actual job detriment. Quid pro
quo sexual harassment is merely a subset of disparate treatment
discrimination where the conduct charged constitutes harassment.
While some may argue that quid pro quo harassment has always
been a subset of disparate treatment discrimination, there was in
fact a real distinction between the type of conduct that supported a
sexual harassment claim and the type of conduct that supported a
disparate treatment claim. At the very least, the distinction was
sufficient to substantially delay the recognition of required sexual
harassment claims as unquestionably actionable, unlike disparate
treatment discrimination claims. 188 Rather than being considered
sex discrimination, sexual harassment was viewed by some courts
as merely harassment based on physical attraction. 189
The assimilation of quid pro quo harassment into disparate
treatment discrimination seemingly leaves the hostile work
environment .3exual harassment claim as a misfit piece of the Title
(suggesting doctrinal links between sexual harassment and sex discrimination).
1116
Any gender-motivated conduct that can be viewed as harassment may be actionable
as sexual harassment. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (noting that "harassing conduct need not
be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex");
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 1999) ('The single question that
we need to answer after Oncale is a straightforward one: Can one reasonably infer from the
evidence before us that the harassment Shepherd describes was discrimination 'because of
his sex?").
187
Some courts require tangible job detriment for a disparate treatment claim. See, e.g.,
Breeding, 164 F.3d at 1157 ('We conclude that Ms. Breeding has not presented a submissible
case of either direct or indirect evidence of either age or sex discrimination against her,
because she has n•Jt demonstrated that she suffered any adverse employment action."); see
also White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13.
188
See Franke supra note 54, at 698 ('After a period of unsuccessful litigation in which
sexual harassment claims were dismissed ... , feminist advocates provoked a paradigm shift
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in which the sexism in sexual harassment was recognized
in the law."); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 ('Women lost some of the first Title VII cases
challenging harassment."); Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome"
Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1558, 1563 (1992) ('It was
thirteen years before a court finally used Title VII to remedy sexual harassment.").
189
See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 59 (detailing early sexual
harassment cases); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 (noting that during Title VII's formative
years, some courts did not consider sexual harassment to be sex discrimination).
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VII puzzle. It is not. The hostile work environment harassment
claim's position actually clarifies the legal theory supporting Title
VII. Hostile work environment harassment consists of gender-based
harassment that causes a change in the terms of an employee's
employment but does not result in actual job detriment. Symmetry
would require that there be a disparate treatment analog to hostile
work environment sexual harassment, a hostile work environment
disparate treatment claim consisting of gender-based conduct,
treatment, or decisions that cause a change in the terms of an
employee's employment without resulting in actual job detriment.
The Susan Jones hypothetical purposely illustrates this point.
In a nutshell, Susan Jones was told by partners and employees
at PW that she needed to conform to an antiquated view of a woman
in order to become a partner. Upset at her treatment, unwilling to
alter her behavior, and fearing that a negative partnership vote
would adversely affect her career, Susan Jones left PW to join
another accounting firm. The conduct Susan encountered at PW
indicated that she was to be held to a different standard than male
accountants; her partnership was contingent on gender-influenced
criteria not related to her job. The conduct also created working
conditions that were more difficult for Susan Jones because of her
sex. Not only was she concerned about whether her candidacy
would be judged the same way as a male partner candidate's would,
she also was told repeatedly that PW valued her as a particular type
of woman rather than merely as an accountant. The conduct Susan
endured was gender-motivated sex stereotyping similar to the
conduct in Price Waterhouse, 190 and would support a disparate
treatment claim had actual job detriment occurred.

190
See supra notes 30·37 and accompanying text (discussing Price Waterhouse case). Had
Susan been declined a partnership, her treatment would support a disparate treatment claim
if the gender-motivated sexual stereotyping by PW's partners directly informed the decision
to decline her partnership. Susan's case could also be treated as a quid pro quo sexual
harassment case. Her partnership was held because she refused to model herself as a
stereotypical woman partner. A quid pro quo case requires gender-motivated harassment
resulting in a tangible job detriment. Susan suffered a tangible job detriment after declining
to change her appearance or behavior. If the PW partners' acknowledged requirement that
Susan acquiescence to a gender-based vision of a woman partner to gain a partnership can
be fairly considered sexual harassment, her case might state a quid pro quo harassment case.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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The remaining issue is whether the offending conduct led to the
discriminatory provision of terms of employment because of sex in
the same way that sexual harassment results in discrimination in
a hostile work environment case. The conduct described in the
hypothetical would likely have the same effect that harassment
would. 191 Susan Jones was told by PW's partners and her coworkers that, in order to become a partner, she needed to change
her behavior to conform to the partnership's gender-influenced
vision of a woman partner. 192 Even if the statements from her coworkers did not indicate that Susan needed to change her behavior,
the statements from PW's partners clearly did. Being told by
partners who will vote on one's partnership that behavior
modification should occur suggests that the partnership requires
modification. Whether the statements indicating that Susan should
change her behavior came in the form of friendly advice from those
191
Indeed, the conduct to which Susan was subjected could, in theory, constitute sexual
harassment. Since Price Waterhouse tells us that sex stereotyping is conduct motivated by
sex, the conduct dlrected at Susan was "sexual" for sexual harassment purposes. The
remaining question is whether the conduct was harassing. It may be, as the intent of the
conduct was to have Susan alter her behavior for gender-motivated reasons.
The conduct Susan endured was arguably unwelcome. Unwelcomeness is usually
defined in the conte:rt ofsexually offensive conduct or sexual advances, and in such situations
can be easy to identify. Conduct is unwelcome or not welcome because plaintiffs wish the
conduct would stop or wish it had never occurred. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) C'In order to constitute harassment, this conduct must be
unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the
employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."). Being told to change one's
appearance and personality is unwelcome, as is being told that women are to be judged by
personal characteristics unrelated to accounting. This is particularly true when the
comments come from partners who might have the power to control or influence whether
employees become partners. Conversely, Susan may welcome the comments if she has no
problem conforming to PW's stereotypical vision of a woman partner and views the comments
as helpful hints, even while she does not welcome the underlying method of choosing
partners. However, if Susan does not want to conform, being told that one will be judged on
how well one fits a stereotypical ideal is not welcome. The partners' conduct could be viewed
as unwelcome because it is arguably part of the official message from the partnership about
the decisionmaking process. For the same reason, the partners' conduct could be
harassment-it seeks an involuntary change of behavior. While an argument can be made
that the conduct at PW was harassment, it looks much more like non-harassing
discriminatory conduct.
192
This advice IS similar to that which the partner at Price Waterhouse gave Hopkins
after her partnership vote. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989)
(recalling that Hopkins was told that "in order to improve her chances for partnership •..
[she] should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry'").
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who wanted her to become a partner or in the form of threatening
commands from those who believed she would resist change, the
statements indicated to Susan that she must change in order to
advance professionally. 193 To the extent that she faced the same
type of harm, including fear and emotional distress, that a victim of
a hostile work environment sexual harassment may face, 194 Susan
Jones should be able to recover for that harm.
Susan Jones endured conduct that would be sufficient to support
both a disparate treatment and a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim. Any concerns that a hostile work environment
disparate treatment claim would inappropriately link disparate
treatment conduct to sexual harassment harm is misplaced. As
explained above, the Supreme Court implicitly resolved this concern
by leveling distinctions between disparate treatment discrimination
and sexual harassment through its realignment of disparate
treatment, quid pro quo, and hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims. Susan Jones should be able to state a sex
discrimination claim of some sort.
Susan should be able to recover based on discriminatory conduct
that has yet to cause actual job detriment. In some circumstances,
Title VII provides recovery for conduct that occurs even before a
plaintiff has taken a job. 195 Presumably, had Susan been told that
she would need to promise to act femininely or she would not be
hired, the job offer woqld be actionable under Title VII. 196 In
addition, Susan could also recover for sex stereotyping that affected
an actual partnership decision. 197

193
Encouraging unwanted behavior modification is often the essence ofharassment. The
desire to prevent employers from forcing employees to change their behavior in order to
procure job benefits is arguably at the heart of anti-discrimination statutes. See MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 104 (arguing that laws against sexual harassment
are call for self-determination). This does not necessarily suggest that the conduct Susan
endured was harassment, just that it had the same impact as harassment.
194
See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing emotional distress in
hostile work environment claims).
1911
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999) (stating that discriminatory failures to hire are
covered by Title VII).
196
In the civil rights/employment context, discriminatory offers can form the basis of a
suit. E.g., Sharkey v. Lasmo, 992 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Currie v. Danna, No. 92 C
8021, 1994 WL 494708 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1994).
197
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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Susan Jones's hostile work environment disparate treatment
claim is simply a middle ground between the discriminatory offer
and the denied partnership. If she can prove that comments from
the partners about the partnership decision indicated that her terms
of employment were different from or more onerous than those of
her male colleagues and that the comments created or reflected an
atmosphere that made it more difficult for her to thrive
professionally, she should be able to recover. Little reason exists to
immunize from liability statements and actions that reflect the
reality that an employment decision will be based on discriminatory
attitudes.
The harm that Susan Jones suffered is a hostile work
environment harm. Consequently, she should be able to recover the
same type of damages that any hostile work environment plaintiff
could recover. Whether Susan's damages are few or substantial, she
should be able to state a Title VII claim. 198 Title VII does not
generally excuse proven discrimination from liability based on
seriousness. 199
Rather than being immunized, relatively
insubstantial discrimination should yield small damages. 200
That PW should be deemed responsible for Susan's injury cannot
be seriously challenged. Rather than making certain that Susan
had every reason to believe she would be treated fairly regardless of
her gender, PW's partners condoned and encouraged sex
stereotyping.
Consequently, PW is responsible for Susan's
predicament, and Title VII should be available to remedy the
situation even before Susan's partnership decision is made. PW's
actual responsibility supports liability. 201 While sexual harassment

198
See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that inconsequential
effect of discrimination relates to amount of damages, not to existence ofliability); White, De
Minimis Discrimirultion, supra note 13, at 1141 (suggesting that even inconsequential
discrimination should result in liability and small damages rather than finding ofno liability).
198
See generally White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13.
200
See id. at 1163·64 ("In cases where the worker is motivated to sue over discrimination,
however, any 'de minimis' nature of the discrimination may be addressed at the remedial
stage. It should not be addressed by reading such discrimination out of the statute.").
201
Though many suggest that sexual harassment is based on vicarious liability, sexual
harassment law is actually based on employer responsibility. For example, when a supervisor
acts as the employer, he becomes the employer for purposes of the action undertaken. See
Faragherv. CityofBocaRaton, 1524 U.S. 775, 790·91 (1998)(citingnumerouscasestosupport
employer liability). Vicarious liability exists when an employer is deemed responsible for
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liability may be vicarious, it is not merely assigned liability. Title
VII liability describes liability for which the employer is actually
responsible, rather than merely liability for which the employer
must compensate. 202
Were Susan not allowed to bring a hostile work environment
disparate treatment claim, she would have four options. First,
Susan might attempt to shoehorn her case into a traditional hostile
work environment framework. She would have to rely on an
extremely sympathetic court with an expansive definition of
harassment. Second, Susan could hope to make partner, risking
failure because of PW's sex stereotyping, all the while suffering
emotional damage that could affect her work sufficiently to make
her a questionable candidate on the merits. She would have to wait
for a negative employment decision, then sue. 208 At that point, she
would be able to state a disparate treatment claim. 204 Third, Susan
might quit, preferring not to risk a negative decision that she would

something arguably out ofits controL That is generally not the case with sexual harassment.
Supervisors act as the employer for many purposes. The employer is not merely deemed
responsible for the workplace, the employer, through the supervisor, is responsible for the
workplace. Consequently, what occurs in the workplace with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment generally is the employer's responsibility. Most
employers are able to control conduct ifthey put forth serious effort. See Estelle D. Franklin,
Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers' Paradox in Responding to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment-A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1517, 1591·93
(1999) (suggesting that employers add bright·line rules to employment contracts allowing
employer to punish gender·motivated conduct short of sexual harassment).
202
Title Vll bases liability on unlawful employer practices: "It shall be an unlawful
employer practice for an employer-to ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999). Consequently,
if the employer is actually not responsible for the discriminatory terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, no liability should exist under Title Vll; the conduct should not be
considered an unlawful employer practice. Since the employer, however, is generally
responsible for the workplace, it should be responsible for what occurs there except in a
narrow set of circumstances. Nonetheless, some call for a negligence standard in sexual
harassment cases. See, e.g., Stephen Kent Madsen, Note, Placing the Blame Where it Does
Not Belong: Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 311 (1999) (arguing for
negligence standard in harassment cases).
203
This is a problem for two reasons. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (indicating plaintiff need not conform to sexual stereotypes); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (indicating that conditions of employment change well before
tangible job detriment occurs and that employee need not wait for tangible job detriment to
sue).
20( However, since Title Vll's goal is to eliminate sex-influenced decisionmaking in
employment, rather than merely to provide a suit when such a decision occurs, that option
is not particularly palatable.
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have to challenge later or explain to a future employer. Presumably
she would not be able to sue successfully unless she alleged a
constructive discharge, a difficult path considering how stringent
the standards are for such cases. 205 Fourth, Susan might alter her
behavior to conform to that of PW's stereotypical female partner.
This is what many of the PW partners and some of Susan's coworkers want but is not what Susan wants.
Susan Jones should not be limited by or to these options; she has
suffered employment harm as a result of gender-based conduct.
Thus, it should not be difficult for Susan to recover if she can prove
the facts of her case. When an employee is harmed for refusing to
conform to sexual stereotypes, she can recover under Title VII. The
employee should be able to do so even before the conduct causes an
actual job detriment.
B. SIMPLIFYING TITLE Vll

The addition of a hostile environment disparate treatment claim
would complete the realignnient and simplification of sex
discrimination that the Supreme Court has begun. When disparate
treatment discrimination, quid pro quo harassment, and hostile
work environment harassment were conceptually distinct, it
arguably made sense to limit disparate treatment claims to those
resulting in actual job detriment. Disparate treatment focused on
employment decisions; given its focus on conduct of a sexual nature,
sexual harassment seemed to cause the alteration of terms of
employment in a very specific way. This no longer describes sex
discrimination jurisprudence.
Today, the Supreme Court seems to be asking two questions
regarding any particular course of conduct: (1) Was the conduct
gender-motivated?; (2) Were the employee's terms of employment
discriminatorily offered or explicitly or constructively altered as a
result of the conduct?206 If the answer to both questions is yes,
205

See James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 992 (lOth Cir. 1994) ('A finding of
constructive discharge must not be based only on the discriminatory act; there must also be
aggravating factors that make staying on the job intolerable."); see also cases cited supra note
89.
205

See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1799 \[A] simplified cause of action should require only
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liability should lie in all instances. The results of such a vision
would be simple. Gender-motivated conduct resulting in tangible
job detriment would be analyzed as quid pro quo harassment or
disparate treatment discrimination. 207 Gender-motivated conduct
not yielding tangible job detriment would be treated as hostile work
environment harassment or hostile work environment disparate
treatment discrimination. This simplification would result in a
more streamlined vision of disparate treatment discrimination, a
vision that the Court seems to desire.
The stage was set for this realignment a long time ago. In Rogers
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 208 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that an Hispanic
employee pleaded an unlawful employment practice based, in part,
on her employer's segregation of Hispanic patients because such
segregation could cause psychological and emotional damage. 209 Put
differently, the court ruled that non-harassing discrimination could
create an actionable racially hostile work environment. The time
has come for the Supreme Court to ratify this vision in the sex
discrimination area.
VI. CONCLUSION

Disparate treatment, quid pro quo, and hostile work environment
were once distinct causes of action that shared some resemblance.
The Supreme Court's recent simplification and realignment of these
causes of action, however, suggest that they are merely slight
variations on the same theme. The Court's simplified reading of

three elements: (1) Causation-Did the challenged conduct occur because of sex (or gender)?
(2) Harm-Was the conduct sufficiently harmful to 'alter the conditions of ... employment
and create an abusive working environment'? (3) Employer Responsibility-Was it conduct
for which the employer is legally responsible?''); Willborn, supra note 10, at 696 ("In

summary, a discrimination-centered model of sexual haraSBment would focus on the two
elements required in every Title VII cause of action: discrimination and an effect on a term
or condition of employment.").
'JJY1 Some courts have already treated disparate treatment discrimination and sexual
harassment prima facie cases similarly. See Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh, 968 F. Supp.
252 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (treating sexual harassment prima facie case just like disparate
treatment prima facie case).
208
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
209
Id. at 240.
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Title VII suggests that gender-motivated conduct that causes the
constructive or explicit discriminatory provision of terms of
employment may yield Title VII liability whenever an employer
knows or should have known about the conduct. This vision of Title
VII demands the creation of a hostile work environment disparate
treatment cause of action encompassing gender-motivated conduct
that constructively alters an employee's terms of employment. It
also suggests quite sensibly that nearly any gender-related conduct
in the workplace that substantially negatively affects an employee's
work is potentially actionable. 210 While a hostile work environment
disparate treatment cause of action could open the floodgates to
additional Title VII litigation, it is nevertheless the logical extension
of the Supreme Court's recent rulings. Having begun to simplify
sexual harassment and sex discrimination, the Supreme Court
should complete the task and face the implications of its actions. 211

210

This is not particularly problematic; given Title VITa goal of ridding the workplace of
di!crimination, suggesting that Title Vll provide a remedy for all workplace discrimination
is not at all radical_ See Maatman, supra note 11, at 81 C'What is needed, then, is a vision of
what constitutes discrimination and its resulting injuries, so courts could consistently
scrutinize employer conduct and employee injuries to determine if interests protected by
antidiscrimination laws have been invaded.'').
211
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (indicating that harm to
employee's job performance is sufficient for Title Vll recovery); Meritor Savs. v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (noting that Title Vll does not require tangible job detriment for recovery).
The harm involved need not cause severe psychological or emotional distress. See Harris, 510
U.S. at 21-22 (ruling that neither severe psychological injury or actual injury is necessary for
recovery). But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(suggesting that de minimis discrimination is not actionable).

